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AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE 1968 'INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS', ACT
DONALD L. BURNETr, JR.*
Introduction
In the Indian Civil Rights Act,' enacted as a rider to the Civil
Rights Act of 1968,2 Congress faced a number of the problems
involved in the relationship between the various Indian tribes and
the federal constitutional system. In order to properly understand
its provisions, however, the Act must be seen in historical per-
spective - in terms of the development of the place of the Indian
in the American legal system and of the legislation itself. Because
the debate in 1968 over the Civil Rights Act centered on the sec-
tions intended primarily to benefit other minorities, so have most
of the commentaries written on it since then, and the necessary
historical analyses of the Indian provisions have not been under-
taken.
Judicial sensitivity is especially important in the area of Indian
civil rights. The United States Commission on Civil Rights re-
cently noted: "In enforcing the act, the courts will have the serious
responsibility of drawing a balance between respect for individual
rights and respect for Indian custom and tradition. Many impor-
tant questions . . .will not be answered until the courts have
settled them."3 In deciding cases involving these provisions, some
courts have not engaged in the sort of historical discussion and
analysis that should be essential.4 An underlying thesis of this
article is that a sense of history will engender greater judicial sensi-
tivity for the need to preserve effective tribal institutions. A better
understanding of the relevant history should aid judicial anal-
ysis and guide the courts and the agencies implementing the
legislation.
*Clerk to Henry F. McQuade, Supreme Court of Idaho; Member of the Idaho Bar;
BA., 1968, Harvard University; J.D., 1971, University of Chicago.
1 25 U.S.C. §§ 1801-03, 1311-12, 1321-26, 1331, 1341 (1970).
2 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, 42 U.S.C.).
3 UNITED STATES COAtMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AMERICAN INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS
HANDBOOK 11 (1972).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 334 F. Supp. 536 (D. Neb. 1971).
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This article, first briefly outlines the history of the issue of
Indian tribal sovereignty and the ways in which federal law in
this area has developed. It next traces the legislative process, espe-
cially the part played by Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina,
which resulted in the Indian civil rights provisions. This analysis
focuses on Senator Ervin's apparent objectives, the interests of the
affected parties, the areas of conflict and accommodation, and
the process of enactment. It then examines the ways in which var-
ious courts have interpreted the Act and how the tribes have been
affected by it.
I. TRiBAL SOVEREGNTY FROM 1786
A. The Early Years: Seminal Concepts
The federal government's Indian affairs policy originated in
times when it regarded the tribes as enemy nations. In 1786, Con-
gress delegated responsibility for Indian affairs to the War Depart-
ment.5 The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was created in 1824,
and President Jackson appointed a Commissioner of Indian Affairs
within the War Department in 1832.0 The responsibility for
administration in the field rested with the local agent, often a
cavalry officer, who was given broad powers "to manage and super-
intend the intercourse with the Indians" and "to carry into effect
such regulations as may be prescribed by the President." The
President, in turn, was "authorized to prescribe such rules and
regulations as he may think fit."8
The states took little part in the management of Indian affairs,
for the Removal Act of 18309 transferred many eastern tribes to
the plains west of the Mississippi River where no states yet existed.
Moreover, in Worcester v. Georgia,0 the Supreme Court held that
native tribes were not subject to the jurisdiction of the states in
which they were located. Chief Justice Marshall described the
5 H. DRIVER, INDIANS OF NoRTH AMERICA 485 (2d ed. rev. 1969).
6 Id. at 482.
7 Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 162, § 7, 4 Stat. 756-37.
8 Id. at § 17, 4 Stat. 738.
9 Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Star. 411-12.
10 31 U.S. (6 ret.) 515 (1852).
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Cherokee tribe as "a distinct community, occupying its own terri-
tory with boundaries accurately described in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force."'1 In an earlier decision holding that
the Cherokees were not a foreign nation within the meaning of the
Constitution for the purpose of determining the Supreme.Court's
original jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall had described the
tribe as a "domestic dependent nation" and had likened each
Indian's relationship to the federal government to that of a "ward
to his guardian.' u 2 These analogies reflected the traditional view
that Indian tribes remained sovereign bodies empowered to reg-
ulate their own affairs, limited only by acts of Congress.13 By virtue
of the federal government's conquest, Congress was viewed as
enjoying plenary authority over Indian affairs.' 4 The treaties
enacted under congressional authority often reserved to the In-
dians the right to retain their traditional institutions and to con-
tinue such essential activities as hunting and fishing.' 5 Their
implications were commonly broad, "[giving] the Indians every
warrant to believe that they could retain their lands, their gov-
ernments, and their way of life as long as they wished."'
6
Thus, the place of Indians and Indian tribes in the American
system was uncertain. Indians were commonly regarded as federal
wards; yet tribal organizations were acknowledged as "distinct
communities" of a sovereign nature.
B. The Era of Conquest: The Rule of the BIA
Following the Bureau's transfer from the War Department to
the Department of the Interior in 1849,17 BIA policy continued to
11 Id. at 560.
12 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
13 See Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal
Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (1969).
14 See Crosse, Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 4 A=. L. REV.
57 (1962).
15 See 2 C. KAPPzR, LAWS AND TREATIES, S. Doc. No. 452, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1903).
16 W. BROPHY 8- S. ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 25
(1966) [hereinafter cited as BROPHY]. This volume expands FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC,
REPORT OF THE COMMIssION ON THE RIGHTS, LIBERTIES AND RS.PONSIBILITIES OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN (W. Brophy & S. Aberle eds. 1961).
17 DRIVER, supra note 5, at 482.
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reflect these conflicting views. The field agents still exercised the
broad statutory power previously noted, but they also created
indigenous police forces and courts or retained them where they
already existed. Of course, this policy was not simply a concession
to the sovereign powers of the tribes. The Indian police, directed
by the local agent, served not only to enforce law and order, but
also to set examples of acculturation to the native communities
and to undermine the authority of recalcitrant chieftains and
councils.' 8 In the 1890's the Indian police were instrumental in
suppressing the Ghost Dance movement among the Sioux, the last
great organized resistance to the inexorable white dominance.1D
The law enforced by these indigenous police detachments was
a mixture of tribal custom and rudimentary codes drafted by the
BIA in the early 1880's. In part, these codes were intended to
supplant native customs, but they were also required because the
trauma of conquest had weakened traditional social controls. 20 The
"successful" experiment with Indian police encouraged the BIA
to establish Indian courts with native judges. Courts of Indian
offenses were established by the Secretary of the Interior in 1883,
and that year's Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs set forth rules, approved by the Secretary, governing the
operation of the new courts.21 In practice, these courts operated
very informally.
22
By the mid-1880's a structure for Indian affairs management
had emerged. Alert to the uncertain legal status of the tribes and
the unclear extent of their sovereign powers, the BIA adopted a
middle course. Certain trappings of tribal sovereignty (in the form
of Indian police and courts) were encouraged, but matters of pol-
18 W. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 69-79 (1966).
19 Id. at 103. For an examination of what underlay the Ghost Dance movement,
see P. FARB, MAN'S RISE TO CIVILIZATION AS SHOWN BY THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS
FROM PRIMEVAL TIMES TO THE COMING OF THE INDUSTRIAL STATE 280-84 (1968).
20 HAGAN, supra note 18, at 9.
21 SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGIrrS OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter cited as
SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS].
22 The extent to which the native judges served the will of local BIA agents
varied with circumstances and personalities; but a report of the Board of Indian
Commissioners in 1892 charged that agent influence remained unduly strong, partly
because appeals from court decisions could be taken to BIA administrators. HAGAN,
supra note 18, at 110.
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icy, such as the drafting of codes, remained exclusively in the
hands of the Bureau.
C. The Settlement Era: The Indians and the Law
As white America pursued its "Manifest Destiny," Indian coun-
try ceased to be remote. Law and order on the reservations gravely
concerned burgeoning numbers of settlers, and the increase in
crimes committed by whites on reservations troubled the Indians
as well. The new courts of Indian offenses exercised jurisdiction in
civil and criminal cases in which both parties were Indian and
also occasionally in cases involving whites on the reservations. But
the creation of states as sovereign entities and a reluctance by the
settlers to entrust serious criminal cases to Indian tribunals re-
sulted in a substantial limitation of Indian court criminal juris-
diction.
State jurisdiction over crimes committed by whites on the reser-
vations was extended in United States v. McBratney23 in which the
Supreme Court held that the United States Circuit Court for
Colorado did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the murder of
one white man by another on the Ute Reservation in Colorado.
The Court said that the United States did not have exclusive
jurisdiction over a reservation unless Congress had expressly
exempted it from state jurisdiction when it had admitted the state
to the Union. No such exemption had been made with respect to
the Ute Reservation,24 and, as a result, Colorado had "acquired
criminal jurisdiction over its own citizens and other white persons
throughout the whole of its territory . . . including the Ute
Reservation .... ,
25
As the Supreme Court extended state criminal jurisdiction over
whites on the reservations, Congress limited Indian court authority
over Indians committing crimes against other Indians on the reser-
23 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
24 The Court sought support from United States v. Ward, 28 Fed. Cas. 397 (No.
16,639) (C.C.D. Kan. 1863) and The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866).
But these cases held merely that where express provisions did exist, Indian lands
were exempt from state jurisdiction. They did not hold that express provision was
an absolute prerequisite. Nevertheless, pressure to extend state jurisdiction, founded
partly in fear of reservations becoming "no man's lands," was so great that Mc-
Bratney became a landmark precedent.
25 United States v. McBratney 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
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vations. In the celebrated Crow Dog case, 20 the Oglala court had
convicted the defendant of murder and ordered him to make resti-
tution in the form of services and property to the victim's family.
This form of penalty was fully consistent with traditional tribal
practices, but outraged whites demanded a more severe punish-
ment. The defendant was tried again and convicted in a Dakota
Territory district court sitting as a United States circuit court.
The Supreme Court held that the district court did not have
jurisdiction over a crime committed in Indian country by one
member of a tribe upon another of the same tribe.27 In response,
Congress eliminated tribal jurisdiction over cases involving serious
crimes.
The Seven Major Crimes Act28 gave territorial courts jurisdic-
tion over enumerated major offenses committed by Indians within
a territory, whether or not on a reservation and gave federal courts
jurisdiction over such offenses when committed by Indians on a
reservation within a state. The validity of the Act was established
in United States v. Kagama,29 in which the Supreme Court upheld
the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the murder of an Indian
by two other Indians on the Hoopa Valley Reservation in Cali-
fornia. The Court recalled Congress' plenary power and reiterated
Marshall's wardship concept: "These Indian tribes are the wards
of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United
States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their
political rights."
30
At the same time, state courts and lower federal courts began to.
extend the logic of the Seven Major Crimes Act to give the states
26 Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
27 Id. at 562.
28 Indian Appropriations Act of 1885, 23 Stat. 885 (1885) [informally and herein-
after referred to as Seven Major Crimes Acti, as amended 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970). In
the original Act of 1885, federal courts and law enforcement agencies were granted
jurisdiction over cases of murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill,
arson, burglary, and larceny committed by one Indian upon another on the reser-
vation. Incest, assault with a dangerous weapon, and embezzlement were added
later. Pub. L. No. 89-707, § 1, 80 Stat. 1100, and Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 501, 82 Stat.
80, amending 23 Stat. 385 (1885). The Act did not abrogate existing treaties. 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1970) (as amended). The Cherokee, expressly granted jurisdiction
over all crimes committed on their reservation by 1785 treaty (7 Stat. 18), were
unaffected.
29 118 U.S. 875 (1886).
30 Id. at 883-84.
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criminal jurisdiction over Indians off the reservation.81 The re-
sulting diminution of the jurisdiction of tribal courts to include
only less serious offenses committed by Indians while on the
reservation led an Oregon district court to declare that the Indian
courts were merely "educational and disciplinary instrumental-
ities, by which the government of the United States is endeavoring
to improve and elevate the condition of these dependent tribes
to whom it sustains the relation of guardian." 32
In 1896, however, the Supreme Court clearly reaffirmed its
adherence to the principle of tribal sovereignty. Talton v. Mayes3"
presented the question whether a Cherokee practice of using a
five-man jury to institute criminal proceedings violated the grand
jury requirement of the fifth amendment. In a landmark opinion,
the Court held that the requirement was applicable only to the
federal government,2 4 saying that because the sovereign powers of
Cherokee governing bodies had existed prior to the white man's
arrival, the Indian courts were not federal agencies subject to the
fifth amendment.385 This reaffirmation of tribal sovereignty carried
into the present century as tribal governments were acknowledged
to enjoy immunity to suit without prior consent. In Turner v.
United States,"" the Supreme Court indicated this view as dictum,
and in 1940, it held flatly that "Indian Nations are exempt from
suit without Congressional authorization."37
31 In re Wolf, 27 F. 606 (W.D. Ark. 1886) (conspiracy of Indians to obtain money
from tribe under false pretenses); Pablo v. People, 23 Colo. 134, 46 P. 636 (1896)
(murder of Indian by Indian); Hunt v. State, 4 Kan. 60 (1866) (murder of Indian
by Indian); State v. Williams, 13 Wash. 335, 43 P. 15 (1895) (murder of Indian by
Indian).
32 United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Ore. 1888).
33 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
34 In this respect, Talton paralleled Hurtado v. California, 110 US. 516 (1884),
in which the Supreme Court had held that states were not required by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to prosecute only after indictment by
a grand jury.
35 Recently, one distinguished commentator has suggested that Talton means
only that a tribal government will not be required to grant a remedial right under
the Constitution, the question of fundamental rights being left open. Lazarus,
Title 11 of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill of Rights, 45 No. DAK. L. REV.
37, 341 (1969).
36 248 US. 354 (1919).
37 United States v. United States Fidelity Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940). The
Court also held the tribes immune to counterclaim except as authorized by statute.
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D. 1920 to 1940: Nations in a Nation
After World War I, Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act,
which provided that "all noncitizen Indians born within the terri-
torial limits of the United States [are] declared to be citizens of
the United States." 38  Most states extended the franchise with this
new citizenship although several states did not.89
Following this grant of citizenship, the Secretary of the Interior
hired the Brookings Institute to survey Indian tribes and to recom-
mend further steps to bring the Indians more completely into the
American mainstream. In 1928, the Institute issued the Meriam
Report,40 which revealed grim economic, educational, and health
conditions on the reservations and stressed the impossibility of
integrating the Indians directly into white society.41 The Report
was highly critical42 of the Indian General Allotment Act of
1887,43 which was an earlier attempt to achieve rapid assimilation.
That Act had distributed Indian land to individual natives in 40,
80, or 100 acre allotments. Through white exploitation of native
ignorance of the formalities of land titles, Indian land holdings
decreased from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million acres in
1934.44
Drawing heavily on the Meriam Report and work begun during
the Hoover administration, 45 New Deal appointees to the Depart-
ment of the Interior were instrumental in drafting and guiding
through Congress the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,40 a major
reform measure. It cancelled the general allotment policy and radi-
cally changed BIA procedures regarding economic development
and community self-government. The most important self-govern-
ment provision was section 16, which authorized the tribes to adopt
38 8 U.S.C. § 3(c) amended 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (1970). A number of Indians,
such as those who had previously enlisted in the armed forces or who had accepted
land allotments were already dtizens by previous legislation. Rice, The Position
of the American Indian in the Law of the United States, 16 J. CoMP. LEG. 86 INT'L
L. 78, 86 (3d Ser. 1934).
39 E.g., Porter v. Hall, 34 Ariz. 308, 271 P. 411 (1928) (holding Indians ineligible
to vote under a state statute denying the franchise to "persons under guardianship").
40 L. mAm, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928).
41 Id. at 86-90.
42 E.g., id. at 7.
43 Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 stat. 388.
44 BROPHY, supra note 16, at 20.
45 Id. at 181.
46 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970).
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their own constitutions and by-laws, to be ratified by a majority of
the members and by the Secretary of the Interior. An elected tribal
council was authorized to pass ordinances consistent with the
tribal constitution.47 The Act authorized the establishment of
tribal courts, to be manned by judges elected by the tribes or
appointed by the councils and to be guided by rules drafted by
the tribes themselves, subject to the Secretary's approval. Wher-
ever a tribal court was established, it superseded the court of
Indian offenses if one existed.48 Finally, the Secretary was au-
thorized to draft a model code as a guide to the tribes and as an
operative code for those tribes who did not draft their own.
49
Although the original version of the Act provided for a court of
Indian affairs with appellate jurisdiction, this provision was re-
moved before passage, leaving unchanged the old system of appeals
to BIA administrators and ultimately to the Secretary.50
The motivation behind the Indian Reorganization Act was to
encourage the establishment of Indian governing bodies to exercise
the sovereign powers which the Supreme Court in Talton had said
belonged to the tribes. This view was expressed by Felix Cohen,
one of the drafters of the Act: "These powers are subject to quali-
fication by treaties and by express legislation by Congress, but,
save as thus expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty
are vested in the Indian tribes and their duly constituted organs
of government." 51 This notion of "internal sovereignty"52 was to
become the watchword of the courts in ensuing decades.
Because many tribes, however, were ill-prepared for self-govern-
ment, the BIA often simply imposed its own code and created the
tribe's constitution, by-laws, council, and court.53 "While the
trappings of autonomy had been created the substance was lacking.
47 The Act provided no express authority for the Secretary to review council-
passed ordinances, but it became customary for him to do so through his local
superintendent. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.1(e); see also SUmmARY REPORT OF HEARINGS, supra
note 21, at 3.
48 25 C.F.R. § 11.1(b) (1969).
49 25 C.F.R. § 11 (1969).
50 H.R. 1REP. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934).
51 U.S. SOLICITOR FOR DEPT. OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 143 (1940).
52 "Internal sovereignty" was contrasted with "external sovereignty"- the tribes'
powers vis-a-vis non-Indians. The tribes enjoyed full sovereign independence from
outside forces except for the federal government.
53 Oliver, The Legal Status of American Indian Tribes, 38 ORE. L. Rrv. 193
(1959).
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No major transfers of governmental functions from the Bureau of
Indian Affairs to the tribes took place.""
In fact, the 1934 Act strengthened the role of the BIA in tribal
affairs, and the Secretary's review powers ensured that the BIA
would still have considerable influence even among those tribes
capable of creating their own governing bodies. While the Bureau
role at first seems inconsistent with the principle of tribal sover-
eignty which the Act was apparently designed to implement, BIA
involvement conformed with the Meriam Report which had
acknowledged that true Indian self-government was a long-term
objective at best, and that Indians should prepare for the eventual
control of their own affairs through the gradual extension of
tribal power.Y5
E. World War II to 1955: Termination and Assimilation
Nearly 25,000 Indians served in the American armed forces
during World War II, and almost twice that number worked in
industry.50 As had been the case following World War I, new
efforts were made after World War II to bring the Indians into the
mainstream of American society. It appeared, however, that while
white America was making room for the native American, it
also threatened to destroy his Indian identity.
The cultural conquest of the recalcitrant red man, by cajol-
ing and by assimilation was at hand. He was measured for
the melting pot. It was with this hope in mind that the
Hoover Commission on postwar governmental reorganiza-
tion, which had been appointed by President Truman, recom-
mended "complete integration" ... . Evidently it was thought
that if the Indian could fight and work like everyone else
then he must be like everyone else.57
Advance warnings of an attempt to remove the confining but
protective fabric woven into the 1934 Act appeared as early as
1943, when the Senate Indian Affairs Subcommittee called for
liquidation of the BIA and termination of its services.5 8 In 1947,
54 Schifter, Trends in Federal Indian Administration, 15 S.D. L. RuY. 1, 4
(1970).
55 MERIAw, supra note 40, at 86-90.
56 DRIVER, supra note 5, at 495.
57 S. STEINER, ToE NE.W INDIANS 23 (1968).
58 S. REp. No. 310, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1943).
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the Commissioner of Indian Affairs presented a plan to the sub-
committee for termination of federal services to some more "ad-
vanced" tribes.0 9 The Hoover Commission, in 1948, coupled its
plea for integration with a proposal to terminate federal services
to tribes and to transfer these functions to the states.60 The next
year, measures were introduced in Congress to abolish the BIA61
and to amend the Constitution to eliminate the power of Congress
over Indian affairs.o2
In 1948, Congress authorized New York to assume criminal juris-
diction over all Indians residing within its borders, 3 and a year
later it extended coverage to include all civil disputes 4 Because
the Indians in New York were relatively assimilated and voiced no
objection to the legislation, these actions created little controversy.
The movement for further extension of state jurisdiction over
Indian reservations throughout the country was slowed tempo-
rarily in 1948 when a bill to that effect failed in the Senate after
passing the House. 0
However, the move to transfer tribes from BIA guardianship to
state jurisdiction gained momentum as the Bureau brought dis-
credit on the system created in 1934. In 1950, Dillon Myer, former
director of the World War II Japanese-American Relocation Pro-
gram, was named Commissioner of Indian Affairs. In order to
implement the BIA's plan to relocate Indians into the cities, Myer
used the Bureau to control or to dispose of reservation lands and
individual property. 0 The BIA also allegedly meddled in tribal
politics, froze tribal funds to quiet dissent on the reservations,
interfered with the tribes' efforts to obtain legal counsel, and re-
59 STEINER, supra note 57, at 23.
60 Report of the Committee on Indian Affairs to the Commission on Organiza-
tion of the Executive Branch of the Government (Oct. 1948), cited in BROPHY, supra
note 16, at 36. The idea of turning Indian problems over to the states was an old
one. In 1882 the Commissioner had recommended that when the Dakota and New
Mfexico territories became states they be given jurisdiction over reservations, but
four years later the Supreme Court warned: "They [the Indians] owe no allegiance
to the States and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling,
the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies."
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886).
61 S. 2726, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
62 95 CONG. RE. 9745 (1949).
63 25 U.S.C. § 232 (1970).
64 25 U.S.C. § 233 (1970).
65 H.R. 4725, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
66 See generally STENER, supra note 57, at 179.
19721
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fused to build permanent community facilities on reservations
(such as a hospital in Papago country) because it would encourage
the natives to remain on their land rather than to relocate. 7
The BIA's abuse of its power to prepare Indians for self-suffi-
ciency moved Congress to attempt "to get out of the Indian busi-
ness."0 s After bills to set tribes "free" under state jurisdiction
nearly passed the Eighty-second Congress, the Eighty-third Congress
adopted House Concurrent Resolution 108, stating in part:
[I]t is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make
the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States
subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges
and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the
United States, to end their status as wards of the United
States, and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives
pertaining to American citizenship .... 09
Bills to transfer jurisdiction over Indians to California, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, and Wisconsin were introduced.1 0
Of these, H.R. 1063 was enacted and became known as Public Law
280.71 Although originally drafted to affect only Indians in Califor-
nia, in its final form it covered Indians in Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oregon, and Wisconsin. Sections 6 and 7 permitted states whose
constitutions contained disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indian af-
fairs to amend their constitutions to exercise such jurisdiction.' In
making this open-ended transfer of authority Congress did not
even require that the Indians be consulted before a state assumed
jurisdiction over them. President Eisenhower signed the bill reluc-
tantly, terming the legislation an "unchristianlike approach" to
Indian problems, and noting further:
67 Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953, 62 YALE L.J. 848, 352-59
(1953).
68 Hearings on H.R. Con. Res. 108 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of
the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 7, at 28
(1953) (remarks of Representative Saylor of Pennsylvania), quoted in Oliver, The
Legal Status of American Indian Tribes, 38 Oa. L. REv. 193, 238 n. 247 (1959).
69 H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. REc. 9968 (1953).
70 These states had no disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indians written into their
constitutions, and their tribes had been previously "consulted" about the transfer,
although no claim was made that their consent had been obtained. H.R. Rr. No.
848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1953).
71 Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, as amended 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970) and
28 US.C. § 1360 (1970).
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The failure to include in these provisions a requirement of
full consultation in order to ascertain the wishes and desires
of the Indians and of final Federal approval, was unfortunate.
I recommended, therefore, that at the earliest possible time in
the next session of the Congress, the act be amended to require
such consultation with the tribes ....
The administration, however, did not submit a bill to implement
the President's recommendation. While several members of Con-
gress responded in the Second Session of the Eightythird Congress
and continued to introduce modifying legislation during the re-
mainder of the decade,7a none was successful.
In 1954, Congress proceeded with legislation to terminate fed-
eral services to selected tribes, as contemplated by House Concur-
rent Resolution 108.74 Several bills proposed to terminate tribes
throughout the west and midwest. The most significant legislation
to emerge was the termination of the Menominee7 5 Klamath,
7 6
72 Hearings on S. 961-968 and S.J. Res. 40 Before Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 243 (1965)
(testimony of Eagle Seelatsee, Chairman, Yakima Tribal Council) [hereinafter
cited as 1965 Hearings].
73 S. 2625 and S. 2838 were introduced by Senators Murray and Goldwater, and
H.R. 7193 by Representative Metcalf, in the next session; all of these bills died
in committee. Similar bills were introduced in later years by these members of
Congress, joined by Representatives Rhodes, Senner, and Olsen, and Senators Burdick
and Mansfield. One bill was successfully shepherded through the Senate by
Senator O'Mahoney of Wyoming, despite resistance of Senator Watkins of Utah,
Chairman of the Indian Affairs Subcommittee, and despite an adverse report from
the Interior Department. 102 CONG. REc. 399 (1956). However, the bill failed to
clear the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee. Id. at 661.
74 House Concurrent Resolution 108 states in part: ".... [A]t the earliest possible
time, all of the Indian tribes and the individual members thereof located within
the States of California, Florida, New York, and Texas, and all of the following
named Indian tribes and individual members thereof, should be freed from Federal
supervision and control and from all disabilities and limitations specially applicable
to Indians: The Flathead Tribe of Montana, the Klamath Tribe of Oregon, the
Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin, the Potowatamie Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska,
and those members of the Chippewa Tribe who are on the Turtle Mountain Reser-
vation, North Dakota. It is further declared to be the sense of the Congress that
upon the release of such tribes and individual members thereof from such dis-
abilities and limitations, all offices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the States
of California, Florida, New York, and Texas and all other offices of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs whose primary purpose was to serve any Indian tribe or individ-
ual Indian freed from Federal supervision should be abolished." H.R. Con. Res.
108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. Rec. 9968 (1955).
75 25 U.S.C. § 891 et seq. (1970).
76 25 U.S.C. § 564 et seq. (1970).
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and various western Oregon77 tribes. The Klamaths promptly lost
most of their timberlands and farmlands, which a Portland bank
acting as trustee sold to the government and to private users fol-
lowing what appeared to be little consultation with the tribe. The
tribe then began to disintegrate as a political and social organiza-
tion.78 The termination of the Menominee also caused the disin-
tegration of the tribal structure, in addition to the near insolvency
of several large tribal enterprises and the depletion of its treasury
reserves before an adjustment to the new situation could be made.70
The termination policy sent a shock through Indian country
which continues to this day.80 The termination controversy also
split the Department of the Interior and the BIA.s' To calm the
storm around him, Secretary Seaton announced in a radio broad-
cast that henceforth no tribe would be terminated unless it fully
understood the program and clearly consented to it. s2 An old les-
son had been re-learned: "The Indian tolerates his present impo-
tent and unjust status in his relations with the Federal Govern-
ment because he sees the Bureau of Indian Affairs as the lesser of
two evils.... [T]he Bureau and only the Bureau stands between
the Indian and extinction as a racial cultural entity."88 The federal
burden was again accepted as part of white society's debt to the
Indian:
As to special Indian rights, since being an Indian is heredi-
tary, the rights at first glance seem anomalous in a democracy;
when we study them, however, the anomaly fades. They are
part of a quid pro quo promised solemnly by us in treaties,
agreements and laws, and upheld over and again by our courts,
in exchange for the whole area of the United States and for the
ending of rightful independence.8
77 25 U.S.C. § 691 et seq. (1970).
78 BROPHY, supra note 16, at 199.
79 Id. at 201-03.
80 "Fear of termination pervades Indian thinking. It colors the Indian's ap.
praisal of every proposal, suggestion and criticism." E. CAiN, OuR BtoTHm's
KEEPzn: THE INDIAN IN WHITE AMESUCA 16 (1969).
81 BROPHY, supra note 16, at 182.
82 105 CONG, REC. 3105 (1959).
83 CAHN, supra note 80, at 14.
84 LaFarge, Termination of Federal Supervision: Disintegration and the Ameri.
can Indians, 311 AnNALS 41-42 (1957).
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F. The Recent Years: The Indians and the Courts
In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 5 the Supreme Court
held that certain tribal property rights established by occupancy
"since time immemorial" could be cancelled by Congress at its
discretion and without compensation. This much-criticized deci-
sion80 has been seen to undercut the principle of the Indian's sover-
eign control of tribal lands and to run counter to the spirit of a
decision in 1941 upholding the notion of sovereign control and
requiring compensation for cancellation of that control.8 7 In Tee-
Hit-Ton the Court declared: "Our conclusion . . . leaves with
Congress, where it belongs, the policy of Indian gratuities for the
termination of Indian occupancy of government-owned land rather
than making compensation for its value a rigid constitutional prin-
ciple."1'8 As termination fever cooled, the significance of Tee-Hit-
Ton diminished. A number of subsequent decisions by the Court
of Claims recognized the tribes' sovereign control of their lands
and resources and ordered compensation on statutory, not consti-
tutional, grounds.89
Lacking clear direction, lower federal courts rendered divergent,
uncertain opinions on issues of tribal sovereignty. The Eighth Cir-
cuit, for example, took the traditional position in Iron Crow v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe,0 upholding the enforcement of a tribal
court's sentence for adultery. The Tenth Circuit was guided by
similar principles in Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe90 as it de-
clined to review a decision by a tribal council which allegedly
denied an Indian the benefits of tribal membership. In Oglala
Sioux Tribe v. Barta,92 however, a district court agreed to hear a
tax collection action brought by the tribe against a non-member
who was leasing tribal land. Normally such a matter would be
85 348 U.S. 272 (1954).
86 E.g., The Supreme Court: 1954 Term, 69 HARv. L. R v. 119, 150 (1955).
87 United States v. Santa Fe & Pacific R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
88 348 U.S. at 290-91 (1954).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Seminole Indians, 180 Ct. CI. 315 (1967); Whitefoot
v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 127 (1961); and Tlingit and Haida Indians v. United
States, 147 Ct. Cl. 315 (1959).
90 2.11 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
91 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 US. 960 (1958).
92 146 F. Supp. 917 (DS.D. 195b).
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under tribal court jurisdiction. The court suggested that the 1984
Act had changed the tribe from a sovereign entity to a federal
agency: "Thus the rights derived from original sovereignty have
been directly channeled into a Federal statutory scheme and all
tribal powers are exercised under Federal law." 3 When the lessee
appealed, the Eighth Circuit upheld the tribe's right to exact a dis-
criminatory tax on non-Indians on the reservation, despite the due
process protections of the fifth amendment or the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth. 94 It also held that the lower court had not
acted improperly in hearing the casesY5 Thus, the appeals court
implied that federal jurisdiction rested on the tribe's operation
under federal law but that provisions of the federal Constitution
remained inapplicable.
A less puzzling retreat from the tribal sovereignty principle ap-
peared when the plaintiff in Martinez,0 who had failed in federal
court, sought a remedy in Colorado courts. The Colorado Supreme
Court,0 7 noting that the plaintiff's remedy had been denied in
tribal and federal courts, reasoned that to deprive her of any rem-
edy whatever would deny her equal protection of the laws and
agreed to hear the case. The court maintained that incorporation
under the 1934 Act constituted an expression of consent by the
tribe to be sued in state court, because as a corporation, the tribe
had recourse to state courts for protection of its rights, and it
should, therefore, be required to answer the claims of others in
state courts as well.
Notwithstanding the Colorado Supreme Court's decision, the
movement away from tribal sovereignty during the years following
1954 slowed as two widely publicized decisions in Navaho country
again reaffirmed the principle of tribal sovereignty by denying con-
stitutional guarantees of individual rights to Indians in disputes
with their tribal governments. In 1959, members of the Native
American Church brought a first amendment attack in federal
court on a Navaho ordinance which prohibited them from using or
possessing peyote, a mild hallucinogen, as a substitute for the usual
93 Id. at 918.
94 259 F.2d 553, 556-57 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 858 U.S. 932 (1958).
95 Id. at 555-57.
96 Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 960 (1958).
97 Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 150 Colo. 504, 374 P. 2d 691 (1962).
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Christian sacraments. In an earlier first amendment action, charg-
ing infringement of religious freedom of Protestants in a Catholic
pueblo, a federal district court had dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion;98 but in Native American Church v. Navaho Tribal Coun-
cil,99 the Tenth Circuit did not refuse jurisdiction, even though
the Navaho tribe had not organized under the 1934 Act. Rather,
the court held that, with respect to freedom of religion, the Con-
stitution did not apply to the Navaho tribe. The first and four-
teenth amendments were interpreted as restrictions on the state
and federal but not on tribal governments. The argument that the
tribe was actually a federal agency was dismissed.
In the same year, the Supreme Court clarified limitations of
state jurisdiction over civil disputes on the reservation in cases
where the state had not assumed full jurisdiction under Public
Law 280. In Williams v. Lee'00 the Court held that a state court
could not compel payment by Indians for goods purchased on
credit at a non-Indian's store on the reservation. The Court noted
that the Navaho court system could exercise broad criminal and
civil jurisdiction over suits by outsiders against tribesmen. It issued
a sweeping endorsement of tribal sovereignty, suggesting the fol-
lowing guideline for allocating disputes between state and tribal
courts: "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the ques-
tion has always been whether the state action infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them." 10 1
Students of Indian problems, deeply affected by the failure of
instant assimilation, entered the 1960's with a renewed awareness
of the need to retain sovereign power in tribal institutions. This
theme was struck in an independent report,102 in the report of a
Department of the Interior Task Force created by the newly ap-
98 Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954.
99 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
100 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
101 Id. at 220. But cf. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 US. 60, 75 (1962)
(dictum). The restriction of non-Indians to tribal courts or courts of Indian offenses
for certain civil remedies, by Williams and subsequent decisions such as United
States ex rel. Rollingson v. Blackfeet Tribal Court, 244 F. Supp. 474 (D. Mont. 1966),
is said to have caused concern among white businessmen on the reservations. Often
viewed by the Indians as exploiters, they feared they could not expect impartial
treatment from a native tribunal.
102 FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE RJGHTS, LABERTIES
AND 1LRSPONSBLrnES OF THE AzmucAN INrCAN (W. Brophy & S. Aberle eds. 1961).
1972]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
pointed Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall, 03 and in the
Declaration of Indian Purpose issued from a native American con-
vocation at the University of Chicago in 1961.104 Unresolved was
the fundamental problem of how tribal institutions should relate
to the constitutional system of the surrounding society.
II. THE ERviN INDIAN INQUIRY AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. Senator Ervin and the Indians
When Congress passed the Removal Act of 1830,105 Andrew
Jackson deployed troops throughout the southeastern United
States to force the Indians westward. One hundred thousand
Indians were resettled, and thousands more died along the "Trail
of Tears" to Oklahoma. However, some tribes, including the
Choctaw, the Seminole, and a band of the Cherokee, resisted. After
50 million and 1500 men had been lost pursuing the Seminole
in the Everglades for two decades, further efforts to enforce the
Removal Act against southern tribes were abandoned. 00
Unlike the Seminole who remained isolated in the Everglades
and the Choctaw who regrouped in sparsely settled areas of Mis-
sissippi, the surviving Cherokee continued to live in close contact
with southern white society. Acquisition of a small reservation in
North Carolina over which federal jurisdiction was concluded in
1868107 established the Cherokee people as permanent residents of
that state.
The co-existence between the white man and the Indian in the
South, nurtured perhaps by a sense of common defeat at the hands
of armies sent from Washington, has resulted in what one observer
has termed the "romantic" southern affection for the Indian and
his heritage.108 Among the southerners who have publicly pro-
claimed this feeling for the Indian is Senator Sam Ervin of North
103 TASK FORCE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, A PROGRAM FOR INDIAN CmIzENs (1961).
104 American Indian Chicago Conference, Declaration of Indian Purpose (June
13-20, 1961).
105 Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411-12.
106 DRIVER, supra note 5, at 486.
107 Id. at 499.
108 Letter from Arthur Lazarus, Jr., counsel to the Association on American
Indian Affairs, to the author, March 3, 1970, on file at office of Harvard Legislative
Research Bureau.
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Carolina.1 9 His professed interest in Indian affairs may also be
reinforced by a large naitve-American constituency in his home
state."10 It has surely been augmented by his repeatedly demon-
strated concern for the protection of constitutional rights.
When the Williams"' and Native American Church" 2 decisions
reaffirmed that systems of tribal government were largely unregu-
lated by the Constitution, Helen Scheirbeck, a Lumbee serving
with Senator Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, ini-
tiated a preliminary inquiry to determine whether such immunity
from constitutional restraint had resulted in actual deprivations
of constitutional rights by the Indian tribes. As the investigation
progressed, it broadened into one of Indian rights in general, as
the Subcommittee staff received numerous complaints about vio-
lations of constitutional guarantees not only by tribal authorities
but also by federal, state, and local officials. However, Senator
Ervin appeared to find the conflict between the Constitution and
tribal sovereignty more intellectually stimulating than the broader
issue of white relations with the Indians.113 Furthermore, Senator
Ervin, who had opposed previous civil rights measures, was careful
at this time to separate the fledgling Indian project from the vola-
tile issues of race relations concerning other minority groups.
In order to maintain his stand on Negro civil rights while in-
vestigating those of the Indian, Senator Ervin and his staff deftly
distinguished red from black. Indians came to be known as "the
minority group most in need of having their rights protected by
the national government.""14 Senator Ervin was later to claim,
"[e]ven though the Indians are the first Americans, the national
policy relating to them has been shamefully different from that
relating to other minorities.""' 5 The Indian project in fact later
109 110 CONG. REc. 22081 (1964).
110 With 40,000 Indians in 1960, North Carolina trailed only Arizona, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, and California in Indian population. STEINER, supra note 57, at
324. 1970 figures reveal approximately 45,739 Indians in the state. UNrrE STATES
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION.
111 See text at note 100, supra.
112 See text at note 99, supra.
118 See, e.g., 107 CONG. Rac. 17121-22 (1961).
114 Letter from Lawrence M. Baskir, Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, to the
author, March 5, 1970, on file at office of the Harvard Legislative Research Bureau.
115 114 CONG. REc. 593 (1968).
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provided Senator Ervin with occasional opportunities to embarrass
his northern liberal colleagues, who were allegedly less interested
in the first Americans than in the politically powerful black com-
munity.
Senator Ervin could politically afford to support Indian rights
largely because of the extensive assimilation of North Carolina
Indians into southern life. The Cherokee and Lumbee settlements
had been fully integrated into the state's governmental structure
as counties and municipalities.116 It has been said that they repre-
sent a small, unaggressive, poorly differentiated minority in the
state."17 This integration has been facilitated, especially in the case
of the Cherokee, by the early evolution of legal institutions
modeled after those of their white neighbors. Their codes, courts,
sheriffs, and police forces, for example, have long been in exis-
tence."18
While this fact freed Senator Ervin to investigate Indian rights
without political difficulty at home, it limited his perspective. Dur-
ing the hearings, he revealed his inclination to try to duplicate the
North Carolina assimilation experience on a national level. He
demonstrated this predilection by focusing on how the systems of
tribal justice outside North Carolina failed to conform to the
country's constitutional scheme. As Senator Ervin launched the
investigation, he cited the preliminary inquiries of his own staff,
the Fund for the Republic Report, and the Department of the
Interior Task Force Report, as factors in his decision to proceed." 9
Each had advanced the conventional thesis that deviations from
constitutional government in the United States were improper in
themselves and required eventual correction.
20
116 Hearings on Constitutional Rights of American Indians Before the Sub.
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings- Part 1].
117 In a 1970 school desegregation dispute, the BIA declared that the Lumbees
lacked a tribal culture and did not constitute a tribe. Franklin, Indians Resist
Integration Plan in Triracial County in Carolina, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 1,
at 78, col. 4.
118. HAGAN, supra note 18, at 19-21.
119 107 CoNG. REGc. 17121 (1961).
120 This language from the Fund for the Republic Report, is expanded in
BROPHY, supra note 16, at 44: "No government should possess the authority to
infringe fundamental civil liberties .... For any tribe to be able to override any
of them violates the very assumptions on which our democratic society was estab-
lished."
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B. The Subcommittee Field Hearings
For the Subcommittee's first official hearing on Indian rights,
Senator Ervin turned to non-Indian authorities. 121 An assistant
secretary of the Department of the Interior, various BIA adminis-
trators, and interested members of Congress were heard first. Then
the hearings moved west to Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona,
North and South Dakota, and California before returning to
Washington where further sessions were held in 1963 and 1965.
Native testimony mixed self-interest and tribal loyalty, bitterness
about white mistreatment and cautious acceptance of Anglo-
American precepts. From this mixture emerged a broad picture of
constitutional neglect which Senator Ervin was determined to rem-
edy. The focus fell first on the tribal system.
1. Constitutional Guarantees and the Tribal System
Tribal politics is politics in a closed circle; it is intense and
deeply personal. 2 2 Traditionally, tribal government has been fully
participatory, controlled mainly by the prospect of shame before
the group. One commentator described nineteenth century tribal
systems:
Law in the sense of formal written codes, of course, they did
not have, but there were dearly defined customary codes of
behavior enforced by public opinion and religious sanctions
.... For most Indians the prospect of scornful glances and
derisive laughter from the circle around the campfire was
the chief instrument of social control. 12
In this century, group pressure remains central, but individual-
ity is not stifled; rather, the security of tribal identity has encour-
aged differentiation without fear of being ostracized and isolated.
Thus, the "[c]ommunality of tribalism does not diminish the In-
dian's individuality. On the contrary it protects him socially and
thus frees him individually. ... The more secure his tribe is, the
more secure the Indian feels - and the more independent and
121 1961 Hearings-Part 1, supra note 116.
122 Note, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HIv. L. Ray. 1818, 1830
(1968).
123 HAGAN, supra note 18, at 11.
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self-confident he is."124 Because the individual's sense of well-being
is based in part on the security of the tribe, an Indian will fre-
quently react more strongly to an attack on tribal institutions than
to an attack on his own individual rights or powers.'-1 This tribal
orientation has been reinforced by the fact that all of the rights
which the United States reserved to Indians by treaty pertained to
the tribes as group entities rather than to individuals and in light
of the confiict with white society over control of group-owned
reservation resources.
2 6
The traditional lack in most tribes of established social classes
further cements tribal ties since there are fewer sources of localized
power and sub-group disaffection. Tribes of the plains, prairies,
and the East (such as the Cheyenne, the Creek, and the Iroquois)
had well-defined systems of rank, but these were primarily based
on achievement and only secondarily on heredity. 27 Certain tribes
of the Northwest which maintained slave systems and the Pueblo
communities of the Southwest were exceptions to this general rule.
The Pueblo communities have been termed theocratic, because
seats on the governing council were filled by the leaders of the
many religious societies. 128 The social adhesive in the tribal systems
appears to have been the collective manner in which decisions
were made - community consent was required before the council
would act. The emphasis was on group harmony: "In council
meetings, it was considered bad form to become self-assertive and
vociferous, and those who did almost never gained the assent of the
council to their proposals."' 2 9 There is some evidence that the
aura of harmony was protected in the past by a policy of expurga-
tion, as deviants were occasionally expelled or put to death.180
Thus, no decisions were made without group consent, but the
group was constantly adjusted to render consent possible.
The scope of tribal governments is generally similar to that of
124 STEINER, supra note 57, at 140.
125 1961 Hearings-Part 1, supra note 116, at 223 (statement of Arthur Lazarus,
Jr.).
126 Id. at 187.
127 DRiVER, supra note 5, at 298, 341.
128 Id. at 297.
129 Id. at 338-39.
130 Id. at 297.
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state or municipal governments in non-Indian communities. 18 1
These bodies make, enforce, and interpret laws affecting the gen-
eral welfare, including the control on the reservation of criminal
behavior not within federal jurisdiction by the Seven Major
Crimes Act. Testimony in Washington revealed that of 247 orga-
nized tribes, 117 (most of them organized under the 1934 Act)
operated under constitutions protecting individual civil rights,
while 130 did not.132 What rights provisions there were in these
constitutions, however, were often incomplete. 133 In addition, 188
other tribes or bands were not organized under any tribal constitu-
tion.131 In tribal courts, the absence of guaranteed rights was illus-
trated in four critical areas of due process - right to counsel, right
to remain silent, right to trial by jury, and right to appeal.
The testimony at the hearings made it clear that few, if any,
tribal courts allowed professional attorneys to appear before them.
Courts of Indian offenses had been prevented by federal regulation
from hearing professional counsel until the Secretary of the In-
terior revoked the regulation on May 16, 1961.135 Generally, repre-
sentation by another member of the tribe was permitted, but an
assistant secretary of the Interior informed the Subcommittee that
he knew of only one Indian lawyer practicing with his tribe. 36
Consequently, a de facto prohibition of professionals prevailed, in
keeping with the informal nature of low-budget courts, managed
by a single judge, without aid of a prosecutor.
37
Many courts failed to advise defendants of their right to remain
silent. In Phoenix, a BIA area director indicated that he knew of
no tribe with protection against self-incrimination written into its
constitution. In practice, however, courts for tribes which were
capable of devoting substantial resources to evidence-gathering
131 BROPHY, supra note 16, at 24.
132 1961 Hearings- Part 1, supra note 116, at 121.
133 Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Sub-
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 4, at 823 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Hearings].
134 1961 Hearings-Part 1, supra note 116, at 166.
135 26 Fed. Reg. 4360 (1961).
136 1961 Hearings-Part 1, supra note 116, at 23.
137 The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A later provided legal
assistance for Indians charged with violations of the Seven Major Crimes Act, and
tried in U.S. district courts, but the 1964 Act did not extend to violators of tribal
regulations brought before tribal courts.
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usually protected the right to silence. 13 Smaller tribes, with less
adequate enforcement facilities and personnel, did not offer this
protection. Asked if he believed silence would prejudice a defen-
dant's case, a Pima-Maricopa judge replied, "It certainly would."'1 9
Most tribes provided for jury trial in some form, following the
pattern established by regulations governing the old courts of In-
dian offenses. Even in those cases, however, the right to jury trial
was often partially abridged. Typically, the jury consisted of six
persons. They received compensation of only 50 cents per day, mak-
ing it very difficult to assemble a jury. Accordingly, defense chal-
lenges were limited to three members of the jury panel. To pre-
vent hung juries and new trials, verdicts could be decided by
majority vote.140 In some areas, moreover, the right to jury trial
was lacking entirely. The Southern Utes of Colorado, for example,
had no provision in their code for jury trials. 41 At Fort Totten-
Devil's Lake, a BIA-appointed judge, pressured by the tribal coun-
cil and police to maintain a high conviction rate, 42 simply refused
all pleas of not guilty. 43 Similarly, a Standing Rock Sioux judge
occasionally circumvented jury trials by incarcerating defendants
even if they had not pleaded or been found guilty. 44
Appellate procedures were similarly attenuated. Among many
tribes, such as the Navaho, the court of appeals was comprised of
all the trial judges sitting together as a panel. 45 Tribes with only
a single judge devised more ingenious procedures; for example,
the Shoshone-Bannock system provided trial by jury on appeal, 40
while the Pima-Maricopa tribal council appointed two laymen
138 1963 Hearings, supra note 133, at 862.
139 Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Sub.
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 366 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings-Part 2].
140 25 C.F.R. § 11.7(d) (1971).
141 1961 Hearings-Part 2, supra note 139, at 436.
142 A BIA practice of receiving efficiency reports on judges from law enforce.
ment personnel made such pressure inevitable. 1961 Hearings-Part 1, supra note
116, at 88 (statement of Senator Quentin Burdick).
143 Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Sub.
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 3, at 769 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Hearings].
144 Id. at 734.
145 1963 Hearings, supra note 133, at 862.
146 Id. at 826.
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when the need arose to serve with the tribal judge on a three-mem-
ber appeals panel.14
7
The principal reason for the denial or abridgement of these
rights was apparently the paucity of resources which most tribes
could allocate to law enforcement. Prohibition of trained lawyers
made possible the continued functioning of the tribal court system
with untrained judges and without prosecutors. Compulsory testi-
mony of defendants eased the costly burden of police investigation.
Eliminating the jury or shifting it to the appeals level relieved
pressure on court budgets. Redundancy of judges at the trial and
appeals levels and ad hoc appointment of laymen for appealed
cases produced similar savings. Despite strivings toward profes-
sionalism and the acceptance in principle by many tribal courts of
due process requirements, 148 budgetary restrictions made infringe-
ment of these rights unavoidable. Average family incomes of
$1,500,149 land held in trust by the BIA, and meager royalties
received for white development of reservation resources"0 pro-
vided inadequate bases for tribal revenue. The approximately
6000-member Pima-Maricopa tribe allotted only $4,500 annually
to cover all court and police operations.'"' Even larger more afflu-
ent tribes, such as the Warm Springs Confederation, which spent
$50,000 annually on judicial and law enforcement activities, re-
garded the financial burden of putting trained personnel in tribal
courts as "impossible." The Confederation's general counsel ob-
served that without financial assistance, "imposition upon the tri-
bal courts of all the requirements of due process as we non-Indians
know them, would mean the end of our tribal courts.' 52
Infringement of constitutional rights by tribal councils, in con-
trast to that by the tribal courts, appeared to manifest more than
147 1961 Hearings- Part 2, supra note 139, at 366.
148 Representative E. Y. Berry later informed Congress that the tribal judges
had formed their own professional society, whose purpose was "to upgrade the
Tribal court system through professional advancement and continuing education."
115 CONG. REc. 938 (1969).
149 Current estimates of Indian family income are generally in the area of
$1500. CAHN, supra note 80, at viii; Collier, The Red Man's Burden, RAMPARTS,
Feb., 1970, at 30.
150 CAHN, supra note 80, at 82-92.
151 1961 Hearings-Part 2, supra note 139, at 367-68.
152 1963 Hearings, supra note 133, at 872.
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simply budgetary distress. One issue which drew Subcommittee
attention to the abuse of council power was freedom of religion.
The refusal of the Tenth Circuit to void the Navaho ordinance
prohibiting the use of peyote in Native American Church53 clearly
illustrated the power of tribal councils. Outlawing the use of
peyote was tantamount to outlawing the Native American Church.
In the hearings, members of the Church complained to the Sub-
committee that they were also victims of police harassment and of
employment discrimination, even at the hands of the BIA, as a re-
sult of religious affiliation. 54
Other witnesses also charged that some tribal councils violated
individuals' constitutional rights. An attorney for the Rosebud
Sioux claimed that many South Dakota tribal councils had with
BIA approval enacted unconstitutional ordinances prohibiting pri-
vate drunkenness2 5;
2. Constitutional Guarantees and the BIA
As the discussion of the authority of tribal councils has indi-
cated, the BIA frequently shared culpability with tribal councils
for failure to observe the requirements of due process. Because the
Bureau was decentralized, with little upward accountability, there
was considerable potential for the abuse of authority at the local
agency level. 15 One Shoshone-Bannock attorney charged the BIA
with neglect of reservation law enforcement. He claimed that al-
though the tribe was authorized to have two chief judges and
three associate judges, the BIA had without cause refused to pro-
vide more than one; and that one was considered arbitrary and
prejudiced. The BIA refused to remove her from office, even when
petitioned by the tribal council to do so.157 When pressed by Sub-
committee counsel in the initial hearings, Interior's Assistant
Solicitor for the Division of Indian Affairs testified that he knew
of no systematic study undertaken by the Department to ascertain
if the code contained unconstitutional provisions.58
The director of the BIA's law enforcement branch further ad-
153 See text at note 99, supra.
154 1961 Hearings- Part 2, supra note 139. at 467-78.
155 1962 Hearings, supra note 143, at 608.
156 CAHN, supra note 80, at 147-55. Reforms in 1970, especially elimination of
area offices, may help to alleviate this problem.
157 1963 Hearings, supra note 133, at 817.
158 1961 Hearings-Part 1, supra note 116, at 112.
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mitted that the Bureau had never attempted to supply Indian
courts with adequate law libraries and had failed even to request
funds for this purpose.159 The executive director of the National
Congress of American Indians subsequently charged that the
Bureau's neglect also extended to inadequate facilities, personnel,
and training; the BIA simply had refused to request greater appro-
priations for these purposes.160
The Subcommittee received testimony alleging that in numerous
instances attorney contracts requiring BIA approval had been de-
layed for such extended periods as to deprive the Indians of legal
counsel. The Shoshone-Bannock reported a delay of eight
months,' 6' and the Quechan (Yuma) testified that a delay of 13
months had caused its prospective attorney to withdraw without
ever serving.0 2 The Navaho reported in later hearings that the
entire staff of the tribe's chief counsel had resigned because of
Bureau delay of contract approvalY.
6 3
The Bureau's refusal to act on requests for code review, pleas
for adequate resources for law enforcement, and submissions of
attorney contracts contrasted sharply with its conscientious screen-
ing of tribal council legislation for adherence to BIA policy. Yet
the Subcommittee failed to find statutory authority for this sort
of activity.0 4 Subcommittee counsel noted that there was no pro-
vision for further review by the courts of such BIA decisions;
appeals were confined to the Interior bureaucracy. 165
The thrust of the testimony was that the BIA was less interested
in the adequacy of law enforcement on the reservations and in the
constitutional rights of the people for whom it was responsible
than in maintaining control over tribal courts and councils and
over the affairs of individuals. The attitude was neatly expressed,
said the Shoshone-Bannock attorney, in a remark attributed to a
BIA employee at Fort Hall: "We didn't have any trouble with the
Indians until they found out they had constitutional rights."'166
159 Id. at 152.
160 Id. at 190, 202.
161 1963 Hearings, supra note 133, at 824.
162 1961 Hearings - Part 2, supra note 189, at 410.
168 1965 Hearings, supra note 72, at 800.
164 SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS, supra note 21, at 8.
165 1961 Hearings-Part 2, supra note 189, at 317.
166 1963 Hearings, supra note 13, at 819.
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3. Constitutional Guarantees and State and
Local Authorities
Subcommittee counsel indicated that a principal reason for in-
vestigating Indian rights was the large number of complaints about
civil liberties violations by federal, state, and local agencies.107
The hearings, however, produced only scattered complaints about
federal officials outside the BIA.168 Rather, if the volume of com-
plaints is any guide to the seriousness of a problem, the greatest
threat to the civil liberties of Indians was presented by the enforce-
ment of state criminal laws by local authorities in communities
relatively near Indian reservations.6 9 For example, the Shoshone-
Bannock and Rosebud Sioux asserted that police from surrounding
communities entered the reservations, where they lacked juris-
diction, to make arrests. 170 Moreover, the Cheyenne River Sioux
claimed that Indians were frequently arrested for crimes for which
whites would not have been prosecuted.17 1
Testimony also revealed occasional mistreatment of Indians
while in custody. The South Dakota Indian Commission charged
that Indian prisoners in some city jails were compelled to perform
manual labor not demanded of non-Indian prisoners. 72 The
Shoshone-Bannock testified that a tribesman intoxicated on clean-
ing fluid was jailed by Pocatello authorities who allegedly were
aware that he required hospitalization. The Indian died within
167 1962 Hearings, supra note 143, at 769.
168 A tribal judge for the Hualapai claimed that the United States attorney
repeatedly refused to prosecute major criminal cases that were placed under federal
jurisdiction by the Seven Major Crimes Act. 1961 Hearings- Part 2, supra note
139, at 3834. The Crow tribe of Montana charged federal game wardens with
failing to enforce hunting and fishing regulations against non-Indians on Indian
reservations. Moreover, the tribe claimed, one federal official had used his airplane
to drive elk herds off the Crow Reservation into Wyoming, where white hunters
waited. 1963 Hearings, supra note 125, at 887.
169 1961 Hearings-Part 1, supra note 116, at 224 (testimony of Arthur Lazarus,
Jr.)
170 1963 Hearings, supra note 133, at 827; 1962 Hearings, supra note 143, at 639.
171 1965 Hearings, supra note 72, at 331.
172 1962 Hearings, supra note 143, at 588. The deliberate nature of this dis-
criminatory treatment was illustrated in the testimony of the Chairman of the
Crow Creek Sioux who quoted a police commissioner in a small South Dakota
town: "Well, I think the boys are going to have to get some more Indians in jail,
because we need a lot of snow moved over there on the north side of town." 1963
Hearings, supra note 133, at 898.
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hours. 73 The Navaho charged police in Gallup, New Mexico, with
"frequent" murder of Indians, citing as a typical case the black-
jack bludgeoning of a tribesman jailed for drunkenness. He died
in his cell the next day without having received medical treat-
ment. 7 4 Spokesmen for the Crow tribe alleged that police in
Billings and Hardin, Montana, customarily released intoxicated
Indians at the city limits, dropping them there even in sub-zero
weather.1 75
During these hearings, non-Indian courts were linked with non-
Indian police as villains. 176 The Shoshone-Bannock charged that
Indian defendants confronted a presumption of guilt in courts off
the reservation. 77 The Hualapai claimed that these courts coop-
erated with police who had made unauthorized arrests on reserva-
tions by attempting to sentence the defendants even though the
courts knew they lacked jurisdiction.17  Representatives of several
tribes, as well as an assistant attorney general of South Dakota,
testified that these courts sentenced Indians to penitentiary terms
for "escape" when the local police negligently or intentionally
allowed the prisoners to "walk away" before completing jail terms
served for misdemeanors. 7 9 One such court was accused of order-
ing the release of Indian prisoners from jail and causing them to
be transported to another state, where they were turned over to a
farmer and forced to harvest crops. 80
Attorneys also related to the Subcommittee deprivations of due
173 Id. at 820-21.
174 Id. at 860-61.
175 Id. at 882-83.
176 Witnesses also claimed that their rights off the reservations were being
violated by local and state officials other than those involved in law enforcement.
Numerous instances were reported of Indians who lived off the reservation and
were legal residents of the states involved being denied care at state hospitals. E.g.,
1961 Hearings-Part 2, supra note 139, at 650. Senator Burdick of North Dakota
testified that reservation Indians were denied use of state correctional schools and
that they could not be accepted in state mental institutions because they were not
considered residents of the states. 1961 Hearings- Part 1, supra note 108, at 88.
Indians residing off the reservations in South Dakota were said to be issued
periodic certificates of non-residency, rendering them ineligible for state welfare
benefits. 1961 Hearings-Part 2, supra note 139, at 603.
177 1963 Hearings, supra note 133, at 828.
178 1961 Hearings- Part 2, supra note 139, at 373-75.
179 E.g., 1962 Hearings, supra note 143, at 631, 699.
180 1963 Hearings, supra note 133, at 860.
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process in arraignment. Right to counsel allegedly was denied or
was not explained to defendants.'"' Instances of local judges dis-
allowing pleas of not guilty were recounted.1 2 One attorney
claimed that in a number of cases when he surprised the prose-
cutor by appearing for Indian defendants, the charges were
dropped. In many other cases, he asserted, the presence of a lawyer
resulted in lesser sentences; in general, unrepresented Indian.
defendants received heavier penalties than their white counter-
parts. 8
3
Testimony received in California revealed another form of
discriminatory treatment. California was charged with failing to
devote adequate resources to law enforcement on its reservations
after jurisdiction over them had been extended following passage
of Public Law 280. The Quechan (Yuma) testified that after
California had obtained jurisdiction over its reservation, the tribe
was "left stranded." Its own law enforcement system was dissolved,
but the California county officials claimed that because the reser-
vation remained federal land, the county had no jurisdiction. The
tribe was, therefore, required to re-hire and to pay its own law
enforcement personnel. 84 Joined by the Rincon, Pala, and Puma
representatives, the Soboba Band of Mission Indians reported
problems of inadequate police protection of their lands and
claimed that the local sheriff occasionally failed to respond to
calls for assistance.
8 5
Frequently, the failure of state officials to provide law enforce-
ment services on reservations where they were empowered to do
so resulted in legal "no man's lands."' 8 Such a situation had been
created on the Soboba reservation. The Navaho reported a similar
181 1962 Hearings, supra note 143, at 598.
182 1961 Hearings- Part 2, supra note 139, at 375.
183 1962 Hearings, supra note 143, at 634-35.
184 1961 Hearings-Part 2, supra note 139, at 406-12.
185 Id. at 830.
186 A similar problem was found occasionally in civil disputes. A merchant, for
example, could not compel an Indian on the reservation to pay a debt or to
relinquish property through a non-Indian court. In practice, however, this problem
has been minimized by the willingness of many tribal authorities to intervene on
the merchant's behalf to avoid refusal of credit to all Indians. Moreover, some
tribes have provided for concurrent state and tribal court jurisdiction in such
cases, but the validity of these arrangements is in doubt unless they are preceded
by tribal referendum and by state authorization under Public Law 280. See text
at notes 316-17, infra.
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difficulty, claiming that when tribal police apprehended whites
for crimes such as rape, murder, and assault committed on the
reservation and delivered them to New Mexico authorities for
trial, the state disclaimed jurisdiction and released the prisoners.1
s7
Extradition posed a related problem. Many tribes were found
not to enjoy reciprocal agreements with the states, or even with
other tribes. The Mescalero Apache testified that an Indian might
commit an offense off the reservation, then find sanctuary on the
reservation if tribal officials were not inclined to arrest and deliver
him.188 The Papago claimed that such difficulties had arisen with
defendants finding refuge on other California reservations. 89
Many of the problems of extradition, "no man's lands," and the
failure of law enforcement in states extending jurisdiction over
the reservations under Public Law 280 had their roots in the un-
willingness of the states to accept the entire burden of law en-
forcement on the reservations. In addition, the assumption of
jurisdiction by the state created a great deal of confusion, as,
virtually overnight, tribal councils were rendered powerless to
legislate and members of the tribe were required to conform to
a "foreign" legal system. Arrangements for a "piecemeal" transfer
of jurisdiction, by negotiation between state and tribe, with careful
groundwork laid prior to each transfer of a specific function,
offered a better solution. One state tried this alternative. In 1963,
Idaho assumed jurisdiction over some formerly Indian responsibil-
ities including school attendance, youth rehabilitation, public
assistance, and domestic relations; but it refrained from further
extension until each tribe affected gave its consent. 90
When the field hearings ended in 1963, nearly 1100 pages of
testimony had been recorded and nearly 2500 questionnaires dis-
tributed in the field had been returned. Expressions of Indian
187 1963 Hearings, supra note 133, at 856-57. Authority of New Mexico courts
to try persons of crimes committed on the Navaho reservation had been established
in State v. Warner, 71 N.M. 418, 379 P.2d 66 (1963). However, a recent deision in
the Ninth Circuit, State ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (1969), held that
Arizona authorities could not enter the Navaho reservation to arrest an Indian.
This decision is critidzed in Comment, The "Right to Tribal Self-Government" and
Jurisdiction of Indian Affairs, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 291.
188 1961 Hearings-Part 2, supra note 139, at 491.
189 Id. at 393.
190 IDAHO CODF §§ 67-5101 to 5103 (Supp. 1969).
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discontent focused on the violation of constitutional rights by
tribal courts and councils, the inadequate support of tribal legal
systems by the BIA, and the violation of constitutional rights by
non-Indian authorities off the reservation or the failure of these
authorities to provide law enforcement services on the reservation
when empowered to do so. As these issues emerged, the interested
parties began to take sides. Indian tribes, the Department of the
Interior, other federal agencies, members of Congress, various
associations of non-Indians, and state governments advocated posi-
tions on issues affecting their interests. At the hub of the contro-
versy was Senator Ervin. His self-assigned task was to sift the
information and to examine the positions of the parties in order to
formulate a complete and sensible response.
C. Proposed Legislation and the Washington Hearings
In 1965, Senator Ervin introduced bills S. 961-968 and S.J. Res.
40, to provide a frame of reference for the hearings convened in
Washington in June of that year.191 The open-ended inquiry of
1961 through 1963 had produced a broad overview of and suffi-
cient data on the Indian rights problem; it was, therefore, time to
focus the attention of the interested parties on the specific pro-
visions of tentative legislation.
The legislation Senator Ervin initially proposed reflected his
personal interests. The first four bills affirmed his conviction that
tribal systems of justice should not be allowed to operate outside
the Constitution. Each measure displayed Senator Ervin's inten-
tion to bring the tribes more fully into the nation's legal main-
stream, establishing the uniformity he had known in North
Carolina. The bills were addressed primarily to bringing the Con-
stitution to the reservations, integrating tribal systems into the
overall legal system of the country, and protecting the principle of
consent of the governed. But the legislation avoided harder, less
abstract questions: how to control the sometimes arbitrary and
unresponsive BIA, how to more adequately fund tribal systems
191 111 CONG. REc. 1784 (1965). Senator Ervin had introduced the same bills as
S. 3041-48 and S.J. Res. 188 in 1964. At that time he cautioned that the bills were
"not to be interpreted as final solutions" and acknowledged that "the language
.... may be revised and concepts clarified as the Senate deliberates these matters."
110 CONG. REc. 17326 (1964).
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of justice, how to halt violations of Indian rights by state and local
officials. The hearings had revealed that the Indians were more
concerned about these questions than they were about any others.
These questions did not, however, present the theoretical consti-
tutional dimensions to capture Senator Ervin's interest; the only
mundane matters to which he responded were lawyers' contracts
and the availability of legal research materials.
1. S. 961
S. 961 provided that any tribe exercising its powers of self-
government would be subject to the same limitations and re-
straints as imposed upon the federal government by the Consti-
tution. Senator Ervin's only concession to the special nature of
Indian tribes was a recognition of their ethnic character; S. 961
would not have subjected them to the "equal protection" require-
ment of the fourteenth amendment, which applied only to states.
Indian reaction to S. 961 varied considerably. The Hopi claimed
to be unaffected, since their constitution was already "in accor-
dance with the U.S. Constitution.' 92 Most tribes, however, echoed
the sentiments of the Mescalero Apaches who were sympathetic
to the purposes of the bill but deemed it "premature" because the
tribes were not psychologically or financially prepared for it.193 At
the other extreme were the Pueblos, who were determined to
maintain their dosed, traditional societies. Their position was clear
and unyielding:
We have long held to our tradition of tribal courts and we
have our own codes. Naturally, we are most familiar with the
special conditions existing in our various communities, and
the status of sovereignty which we have alvays enjoyed has
made us dedicated to the task of preserving it.194
For the Crow tribe the question remained open: "We, at the
Crow Indian Reservation, cherish the opportunity of selecting
our own form of government .... [W]e mean the action of the
Crow Tribal Council shall continue to remain as it is today....
[M]e are confident that the people are satisfied with the present
192 1965 Hearings, supra note 72, at 325.
193 Id. at 340-41.
194 Id. at 352.
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system."19 5 While such statements occasionally betrayed the hint
of self-interest which was to be expected of tribal leaders with a
stake in the existing order, a valid point was expressed nonetheless.
American Indian tribes were many and various, and each had its
unique problems; they were not equally prepared or willing to
accommodate themselves to the structures of the Constitution.
A number of attorneys acknowledged this point and recom-
mended that certain enumerated rights be protected by legislation
rather than by imposing constitutional government in full.90 The
Department of the Interior and BIA also agreed that the blunt
insertion of all constitutional guarantees into tribal systems would
produce disorder and confusion. But the Department adamantly
maintained that "Indian citizenship and tribal freedom from con-
stitutional restraint have been incompatible."' 97 Accordingly, the
Department of Interior offered a substitute for S. 961 which was
limited to ihe following guarantees: the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus by order of a federal court; the right to jury trial with six-
member panels in certain criminal cases; first amendment rights,
excluding the prohibition of establishment of religion; fourth
amendment protection against illegal search and seizure; fifth
amendment rights, excluding the right to grand jury indictment;
sixth amendment rights to fair trial, excluding the right to jury
trial except as otherwise provided but including the right to
counsel at the defendant's own expense; protection against exces-
sive bail or fines; prohibition of ex post facto laws or bills of
attainder; and the right of each member of a tribe to equal pro-
tection of its laws. 108
Among the constitutional rights not included in the Department
of the Interior's substitute which would have been guaranteed by
blanket provision in S. 961 were the right to a grand jury indict-
ment and to a jury panel in all criminal prosecutions and in all
civil disputes involving more than twenty dollars, and the right
to the assistance of counsel.109 In each instance the cost which
195 Id. at 234.
196 Id. at 222.
197 Id. at 317.
198 Id. at 318-19.
199 Other exclusions created no controversy. The rights to bear arms and to re-
fuse housing to soldiers were omitted on the theory that Indian tribes were not
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the guarantee would impose on the already impoverished tribes
was a major reason for its exclusion. In addition, the rights to a
grand jury indictment and to a jury panel in civil cases were con-
sidered to be of questionable contemporary merit.
The Department of the Interior's response to the issue of the
right to defense counsel revealed, however, its insensitive attitude
that the Indians had testified about in the earlier hearings. The
Solicitor recommended that defendants have the right to counsel
but only at their own expense. He claimed that the alternative was
to obtain appropriations from Congress to pay lawyers appointed
by the tribal courts and, in order to maintain a balance, also to
provide prosecutors for the courts. If the problem was one of main-
taining a balance, there was no reason to accord the wealthy de-
fendant a special advantage. Rather, it appeared that the BIA was
reluctant to assume the initiative to obtain extra appropriations
from Congress, 20 as it had similarly failed to request adequate
funds to maintain tribal libraries and other facilities. In view of
the Bureau's past performance, it was not surprising that it pre-
sented the choice essentially as one between the right to counsel
at the defendant's expense or no right to counsel at all, instead of
being prepared to seek funds for a balanced, professional tribal
court system.
Wisely, the Department's substitute for S. 961 deleted fifteenth
amendment protection because the tribes, as ethnic units, were re-
quired to restrict voting to an ethnically determined, rather than
to a geographically defined, community. For the same reason, equal
protection of the laws was guaranteed only to members of the
tribe, in order that non-Indians on reservations could not claim
benefits of tribal membership. Finally, laws respecting the estab-
authorized to maintain troops. No reason was given for exclusion of thirteenth
amendment protection against involuntary servitude, but it may have had something
to do with the fact that, in accord with established custom, courts of Indian of-
fenses were authorized in civil cases to require performance of assigned duties for
individuals or for the tribe in lieu of monetary restitution. 25 C.F.R. § 11, 24 (1971).
200 Another example of the Bureau's delinquency in acquiring funds for Indians
had become manifest when health functions were transferred in 1955 from the BIA
to the Public Health Service. Appropriations instantly increased and stood in
1969 at four times their 1955 level. A sweeping change in attitude was noted by
one Bureau of the Budget official: "The difference between the aggressive presenta-
tion of the PHS and the defensive supplications of the BIA is really something to
see." CAHN, supra note 80, at 59.
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lishment of religion were not prohibited, because such prohibition
would have dissolved the social and political fabric of the theo-
cratic Pueblos. The Department of the Interior and the BIA did
not express long-term support for theocratic forms of government,
but they did acknowledge the immediate need to maintain the
social cohesion of the Pueblos during a period of transition.
The Interior-BIA position on S. 961 was thus a combination of
a sound historical sense and a reluctance to do more to support
the reservation court systems than had been done in the past.
When sensitivity to Indian problems could be expressed without
a commitment, the Department and the Bureau were sensitive; but
when a commitment was required, even to the relatively innocuous
matter of submitting a new appropriations request, they demurred.
2. S. 962
S. 962 authorized appeals of criminal convictions from tribal
courts to federal district courts, with trials de novo on appeal.
Senator Ervin thus recommended a solution to the appeals prob-
lem beyond that established by the Ninth Circuit in 1965. In
Colliflower v. Garland,201 the court had held that courts of Indian
offenses functioned in part as federal agencies since they were
201 342 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1965). Lauded by Senator Ervin as "forward looking,"
Colliflower was something of a surprise, following refusal of a federal district court
in Montana to issue a writ of habeas corpus on grounds that the Constitution
afforded protection of due process and right to counsel only as against the federal
or state governments. Glover v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 19 (D. Mont. 1963). The
point of distinction appeared to be that the Montana case involved a tribal court,
created by the tribe and governed by a tribal code, which could not be termed a
federal agency. Colliflower appeared to authorize the issue of writs of habeas corpus
only in criminal cases tried by courts of Indian offenses, although there was little
qualitative difference between the functions of such courts and those of tribal courts.
In Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 898
U.S. 903 (1970), the court held that the power of federal district courts established
in Colliflower to issue writs of habeas corpus applied to tribal courts as well as to
courts of Indian offenses. The court found no functional basis for distinguishing
between the two types of courts. The Ninth Circuit also held that writs of habeas
corpus may issue even if the petitioner has been punished by fine rather than by
detention. In a companion case, Settler v. Lameer, 419 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970), the court ruled that the writ may issue when
the punishment is detention even when the petitioner is free on bail. In the latter
case, an appeal was still pending within the Yakima system. The Ninth Circuit
apparently rejected a contention that the tribes, like states, have a legitimate
interest in freedom from premature federal court intervention and took a major
step toward relegating tribal courts to the screening function Senator Ervin origi.
nally had envisioned.
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creations of the BIA and were governed by the BIA's model
code.202 As federal agencies, their decisions, therefore, were subject
to limited review under the federal habeas corpus statute.2 03 The
Ervin bill made tribal court decisions similarly reviewable and
expanded the scope of the review of all Indian court decisions by
providing for trial de novo. S. 962 integrated criminal justice on
the reservations directly into the existing federal system and re-
duced the Indian courts to a screening role. Senator Ervin noted
that the North Carolina magistrate system operated in this way
and that it had "worked very well for one hundred years."'204
Many tribes, while not opposed to S. 962's authorization of
appeals of criminal convictions from tribal courts to federal dis-
trict courts, objected to the bill's provision for trial de novo in the
district court because it would severely restrict the functions of the
tribal courts. The Pima-Maricopa claimed that law enforcement on
the reservation would suffer as a result.20 - The United Sioux
Tribes expressed opposition because Indians could not afford to
pay for the legal representation needed in federal court,206 and the
American Civil Liberties Union called for absolute right to ap-
pointed counsel not provided by the 1964 Criminal Justice Act. 207
The Mescalero Apache suggested that cases be remanded to the
tribal courts upon a finding of error.208 The Fort Belknap attorney
concurred, urging that this procedure would serve as a training
device and improve the quality of the tribal courts. The attorney
warned, however, that S. 962, like S. 961, would impose an im-
possible financial burden; for review by federal courts almost
certainly would require the tribes to keep fuller court records,
use proper procedures, and hire prosecutors. 20 9
The Department and the BIA were opposed to S. 962. The
Department had appellate jurisdiction over courts of Indian
offenses and was unwilling to surrender it. It suggested that the
district courts should be empowered to review reservation court
202 25 C.F.R. § 11 (1969).
203 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
204 1965 Hearings, supra note 72, at 91.
205 Id. at 328.
206 Id. at 148.
207 Id. at 224. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970).
208 Id. at 341.
209 Id. at 337.
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decisions only upon the full exhaustion of the administrative
remedy.210 But the Department's insistence on retaining a role in
the tribal justice system contradicted its earlier testimony to the
effect that the Solicitor's office had received no appeals from courts
of Indian offenses.21' It became clear to Subcommittee counsel that
the Department was fighting for a nominal power only, and had
never regarded its appellate role with commitment.
3. S. 963
S. 963 authorized the Attorney General to investigate Indian
claims of violations of their civil rights. This bill served as Senator
Ervin's response to the flood of testimony about the arbitrary
treatment by the BIA and the occasional brutality and discrimina-
tion by state and local officials. The bill appeared to be a broad
commitment to the protection of Indian rights in general, but its
breadth was circumscribed by Senator Ervin's opposition to any
further growth in the investigatory function of the federal govern-
ment. In any event, S. 963 was diluted in significance by its partial
redundancy with authority granted to the Attorney General by
previous legislation, 212 by its failure to authorize funds, and by
its inappropriate reliance on the Attorney General's office to chal-
lenge arbitrary practices in another federal agency, the BIA.
Although S. 963 was considered a token gesture, it nevertheless
won the support of many tribes, who welcomed any additional
pressure on the federal government to investigate civil rights com-
plaints. But the leaders of some tribes, including the Pueblos,
opposed the bill, explaining, "[w]e understand, better than non-
Indians, the background and traditions which shape Indian con-
duct and thinking, and we do not want so important a matter to
be tried by those who are not familiar with them." 218 Thus, while
some Indian leaders welcomed the investigation of non-Indian
210 This position varied from that expressed by the Assistant Secretary in 1961,
when he opposed any kind of institutionalized review of reservation court decisions
on the ground that such a review structure might tend to make these courts
permanent, while he believed that they should eventually disappear, as all other
vestiges of Indian "separateness" from the rest of society should disappear. 1961
Hearings-Part 1, supra note 116, at 12, 26.
211 Id. at 115.
212 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970).
213 1965 Hearings, supra note 72, at 352-53.
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courts, police, and officials, they protested being subjected to that
scrutiny themselves.
S. 963 also met with the opposition of the Department of the In-
terior. The Solicitor asserted that many of the complaints of
such violations were made to the Department and were already
forwarded. The Department wanted to retain its power to screen
complaints before they were forwarded to the Justice Depart-
ment. Indeed, it suggested substitute legislation which would have
channeled all complaints pertaining to the tribal councils through
the Secretary.2 14 The Department's concern over the disposition of
Indian complaints of interference or mistreatment appeared to be
largely self-interested. Testimony which revealed that of 79 com-
plaints screened and forwarded to the Justice Department since
1962 no convictions had been obtained cast doubt on the De-
partment's sense of follow-up responsibility to the Indian com-
plainants. 15 Of course, it also caused skepticism that giving new
investigative and prosecutorial authority to Justice would produce
impressive results.
4. S. 964
S. 964 directed the Secretary of the Interior to recommend to
Congress a new model code for the courts of Indian offenses,
which would serve as a guide for the tribal courts. It also pro-
vided for the establishment of special training classes for all tribal
judges. The purpose of this measure was unclear. In light of S. 961
and 962, a new model code appeared to be superfluous. And al-
though the further education of tribal judges would be helpful,
there seemed little likelihood that it would bring immediate
results, since most of the infringements of right in tribal courts
seemed to be the result of financial restraints. None of Senator
Ervin's bills authorized appropriations to remedy this basic
problem.2
10
S. 964's provision for the training of tribal judges won Indian
214 Id. at 318-19.
215 Id. at 27.
216 The subsequent creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
has partially alleviated the funding problem, since some assistance grants have been
channeled to tribes. See, e.g., CouRT REy., Oct., 1971, at 1 (a publication of the
North American Judges Association).
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support, but the tribes did not agree about its provisions for a
model code. Some tribes, such as Pyramid Lake Paiute and Turtle
Mountain Chippewa, expressed unqualified support.217 Many
others, however, shared the Department of the Interior's criticism
that the bill might effectively impose the model code on the tribes.
As long as the code remained a model, cautioned the Hopi and
Apache, it would be useful.218 The Pueblos predictably were op-
posed, and the Chairman of the All-Pueblo Council requested that
the drafting of codes be left to the tribes.
219
The Department of the Interior objected weakly to the work
that proposing the new model code would require. It claimed that
the necessary allowance for variations in tribal culture and condi-
tions would render the code meaningless, or the failure to make
such an allowance would destroy many tribes as surely as would
S. 961 in the form Senator Ervin had proposed. Had the Depart-
ment been fully convinced of its own argument, it would have
resisted S. 964 as vigorously as it resisted S. 961. Instead, the So-
licitor remarked, "Let me say I do not feel very strongly about
this. In fact, the Department does not take a position that this
is any disaster." 220 Moreover, while it was claimed that the tribes
would be deprived of valuable drafting experience if they were
just handed a model code, the Solicitor expressed his belief that
the tribes would use the model much as states use proposed model
codes, i.e., as the basis for hearings and debates. In fact, he ad-
mitted, the Department had long recommended the old model
code to the tribes, and the concept of a model was not unfamiliar
to them.2
2'
5. S. 965, S. 966, and S. 967
While the first four bills /vere intended to protect individual
rights, Senator Ervin's next three proposals were addressed to the
problems of inadequate law enforcement, especially in those states
that assumed jurisdiction over Indians in accordance with Public
217 1965 Hearings, supra note 72, at 348-49.
218 Id. at 326, 343.
219 Id. at 191.
220 Id. at 28.
221 Id. at 28-29.
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Law 280.222 In order to eliminate "no man's lands," S. 965 pro-
vided for the extension of federal jurisdiction over crimes com-
mitted by non-Indians on the reservation, if a state failed to
exercise its jurisdiction.223 Senator Ervin's provision for federal
rather than tribal jurisdiction again illustrated his determination
to bring the reservations within the federal system. This measure
might also have mitigated the extradition problem, since such
agreements exist between state and federal authorities. It would
not, however, have solved extradition problems among tribes or
between tribes and the states.
With S. 966, Senator Ervin went to the heart of the jurisdiction
issue. While Public Law 280 had provided for the transfer of
complete jurisdiction, testimony had revealed that some states
were unwilling to immediately assume the total burden; hence,
these states left the tribes in confusion. The result, said Senator
Ervin, was "a breakdown in the administration of justice to such
a degree that Indians are being denied due process and equal pro-
tection of the law."224 He also expressed the conviction that Public
Law 280 violated the principle of government by consent of the
governed. Accordingly, S. 966 provided for the repeal of those
sections of Public Law 280 which authorized the extension of state
jurisdiction without the consent of the tribes involved. It made
consent a prerequisite for the extension of jurisdiction, and it
authorized the United States to accept the retrocessions of juris-
diction from states who wished to be free of the burdens that they
had previously assumed. These revisions of Public Law 280 left
the states free to experiment with "piecemeal" extensions of juris-
diction; but they did not authorize the tribes to initiate such
agreements or arrangements.
225
S. 967 filled a gap in the Seven Major Crimes Act by extending
222 See text between notes 71 and 72, supra.
223 The Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), incorporates state
law into federal law in areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction. Thus, S. 965 was
redundant in all but Public Law 280 states or others in which reservations were
not exclusively under federal control.
224 1965 Hearings, supra note 72, at 4.
225 Similar legislation had been introduced in both houses by the Montana
delegation in the previous session, but had died in the Interior Committees. 109
CONG. REc. 192, 568 (1963).
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federal jurisdiction to cover "aggravated assault." Senator Ervin's
attention apparently had been attracted by the testimony of a
Hualapai judge who had told of a case in which one Indian had
caused permanent injury to another Indian by pouring five gallons
of boiling water on him. Because the crime was not interpreted as
"assault with a deadly weapon," the federal government disclaimed
jurisdiction. As a result, the offender was convicted in tribal court,
which was limited by code to sentences of six months or less.
220
The bills to alleviate the jurisdictional problems of law enforce-
ment on the reservations received the overwhelming support of
the Indians. Not even the Pueblos objected to S. 965 or S. 967. The
tribal attorney from Fort Belknap claimed, however, that S. 965
was "not worth the weight of its paper."
227
S. 966 was also favorably received. Vine Deloria, Jr., then serving
as Executive Director of the National Congress of American In-
dians, voiced the mood of the Indians in support of gradualism
and consent: "Not only will we have consent of the governed if
we get S. 966 passed, but we can have the opportunity then to be
released from this psychological fear on the reservation of having
the whole culture run over."228 The bill's provision for "piece-
meal" agreements did, however, receive some criticism. The
Mescalero Apache and the Yakima, among others, argued that if
difficulties arose tribes should be able to withdraw their consent
to such arrangements on reasonable notice to the states. They also
asked that the tribes be able to initiate retrocessions of jurisdic-
tion from the states -in effect, to make the consent provision
retroactive.
229
The bills Senator Ervin proposed to deal with the problems of
226 1961 Hearings-Part 2, supra note 120, at 584.
227 1965 Hearings at 337.
228 Id. at 198. Other testimony demonstrated that there were adequate grounds
for this fear. The United Sioux claimed that South Dakota refused to require
Indian consent in its 1963 act extending jurisdiction- an act later defeated by
referendum after a vigorous Sioux campaign. Said one leader: "We begged the
State committee to put in a consent clause. We pointed out that if State law was
good, the Indians would take it. The answer was: 'State law is so good for you we
are afraid to let you vote on it because you might turn it down.'" Id. at 149.
Spokesmen for the Seminole of Florida and Nez Perce of Idaho spoke of the
better approach of their respective states which extended jurisdiction only after
full consultation and tribal consent. Id. at 347, 350.
229 Id. at 342, 344.
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state jurisdiction on reservations posed no troublesome issues
to the Department of Interior as its interests were not involved.
Accordingly, it agreed with the positions taken by the Department
of Justice. The Justice Department predictably opposed the pas-
sage of S. 965, since that bill would have thrust upon federal law
enforcement authorities the responsibility for monitoring the
performance of the states and assuming jurisdiction on reservations
whenever the states failed to perform their duties. The Interior
Department favored the consent requirement of S. 966 even
though it had supported Public Law 280 when it had been
adopted; but it aligned itself with the Justice Department, warn-
ing that "piecemeal" arrangements might create "unnecessary
confusion in the enforcement of criminal statutes and in the ad-
ministration of Indian affairs." 230 The Department of Interior
offered no opinion on S. 967, pending analysis by the Justice De-
partment of a similar bill. The Interior Department's deference
to the Justice Department on these measures reinforced the im-
pression that it responded in an accommodating fashion when no
commitment of its own was required.
6. S. 968 and S.J. Res. 40
Senator Ervin's last bill and his proposed resolution were in-
tended to halt two troublesome administrative practices of the
Department of the Interior. S. 968 provided that any attorney con-
tract submitted by a tribe for BIA approval would automatically
be, approved at the end of 90 days, unless contrary action were
taken prior to that time. Senator Ervin considered that the long
delays in the approval of attorney contracts were particularly intol-
erable because "no group in the United States has more problems
requiring expert legal assistance than the American Indians."
231
For the same reason, Senator Ervin urged the adoption of S.J.
Res. 40 which would direct the Secretary of the Interior to revise,
update, and consolidate legal materials pertaining to the Indians.
The disorganized manner in which treaties, laws, executive orders,
regulations, Solicitor's opinions, and other relevant documents
had been complied and distributed had impeded research on In-
230 Id. at 321.
231 Id. at 4.
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dian rights. Moreover, testimony in earlier hearings had shown
that in many instances, tribal libraries had ben inadequately sup-
plied with such materials.
232
As expected, S. 968 and S.J. Res. 40 met little resistance from
the tribes. Most favored compelling the Department of the Interior
to pass on attorney contracts more rapidly,233 and all of them fa-
vored any measure which would help them to maintain more
complete law libraries for use by their courts and councils.
The Department of the Interior's reaction to S. 968 and S.J.
Res. 40 illustrated its attitude whenever pressed for a concrete
commitment of its own resources. The Department opposed S. 968,
arguing that the problem of delays in contract review had been
solved by delegating approval authority to area directors and that
it would feel compelled by any automatic deadline to issue pre-
mature notices of disapproval whenever evaluation became pro-
tracted. The Department's actual objection probably was to the
limiting of its discretionary authority. Questioned by Subcom-
mittee counsel why more than 90 days should be required to
review attorney contracts, the Solicitor suggested that if Congress
was dissatisfied with Interior's performance it should find another
agency to review tribe-attorney contracts.23 4 Of course, no other
agency would, in fact, have been appropriate. The Department
seemed in effect to be saying that it would rather allow contracts to
go unreviewed than to commit itself to a deadline requirement.
Finally, the Department had no objection to S.J. Res. 40 insofar
as it required its personnel to compile treaties, laws, and executive
orders.235 It objected, however, to having to compile regulations
and all the Solicitor's opinions. The Department acknowledged
that many opinions were not distributed, yet were cited as au-
thoritative and frequently guided policy throughout the country.
Assuring the Subcommittee that a central file of opinions was
maintained in Washington, the Department declared, "We believe
232 See text at note 159, supra.
233 A spokesman for the Crow of Montana disagreed, citing an instance in which
the tribe was charged a $279,000 fee under its attorney contract, which it felt was
too high. He asserted that more complete contract review might have avoided such
a situation. 1965 Hearings, supra note 72, at 236.
234 Id. at 45.
235 Treaties had long been compiled, so no additional effort was required in this
area. See note 15, supra.
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that the system makes the opinions readily available to persons
who have a need for them."236 In this instance, the Department
appeared willing to risk sheer unbelievability in order to prevent
a commitment of personnel time and, perhaps, also to avoid wide
circulation of what it had come to regard as "in-house" documents.
7. Summary
In summary, then, Indian reaction to Senator Ervin's bills was
of four basic types. The first was no reaction at all. While the
records of the hearings indicated that the Subcommittee received
some expression of opinion from 70 to 80 tribes, most of the 247
organized tribes did not participate in the hearings, probably
through no fault of the Subcommittee. A second type of reaction
was that of blanket endorsement of the Subcommittee's work,
often accompanied by an expression of surprised delight that so
much attention was being paid to Indians.
Most of the tribes testifying exhibited a third pattern of reac-
tion: they were sympathetic to the purposes of the legislation and
amenable to the eventual merger of the Indian and non-Indian
systems of justice. They were cautious, however, about taking large
steps beyond their psychological preparedness or financial capabil-
ity. Consultation with these tribes usually produced areas of agree-
ment. A fourth reaction was shown principally by the Pueblos,
who had always considered themselves different from and in some
ways superior to the other tribes.237 The old, stable, and very tra-
ditional Pueblo communities were in no way convinced that the
values which their system embodied were inferior to those of white
America. They resisted measures which threatened their culture
or the structure of their authority. When not threatened, the
Pueblos were cooperative; when faced with the possibility of
change imposed from the outside, they were obstinate.
Throughout the debate sparked by Senator Ervin's proposals,
the attitude of the Department of the Interior and of the BIA
remained consistent. When vital organizational interests, such as
reputation and control, were not involved, and when a commit-
ment of resources was not required, they proved to be cooperative.
236 1965 Hearings, supra note 72, at 323.
237 Id. at 352.
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But when confronted with the limitation of their responsibilities
or influence or when pressed for a commitment to additional tasks,
they resisted, even if the interests of the Indian people were
compromised.
III. MAKING INDIAN LAW
A. The Drafting of S. 1843 and its Companions
Senator Ervin was not under immediate pressure from an assert-
ive constituency to proceed with Indian.rights legislation. It had
become a labor of love to which he could allocate his energies as
he chose. Some time elapsed before the revised legislation made its
appearance. On May 23, 1967, the Senator introduced bills S. 1843
through 1847 and S.J. Res. 87.238 Although S. 961 through 968 and
S.J. Res. 40 had been only tentative legislation, they had largely
withstood the scrutiny of the interested parties, and the new bills
were generally -quite similar to the ones introduced in 1965.
S. 1843 revised S. 961 and 962 to provide only enumerated consti-
tutional rights239 and appeals to the federal courts by writ of habeas
corpus instead of by trial de novo.2 40 S. 1844 contained the order
to draft a model code and the judge training provisions. In S. 1845
Senator Ervin maintained his resolve to repeal section 7 of Public
Law 280 and added the requirement that tribal consent had to be
demonstrated by referendum. Because it had been felt that "aggra-
vated assault" did not adequately describe the type of conduct
Senator Ervin was trying to include, S. 1846 proposed addition of
"assault resulting in serious bodily injury" to the Seven Major
238 118 CONG. Ric. 13473-78 (1967).
289 In the main, Senator Ervin had re-drafted S. 961 according to the recom-
mendations of the Interior Department, but on one critical point he deviated from
them. Interior originally worded its "equal protection" provision in such a way
as to limit its application to members of the tribe located within its jurisdiction.
Senator Ervin's revision, however, guaranteed equal protection to any person within
the tribe's jurisdiction. The significance of the altered wording was that it might
be construed to extend equal benefits of tribal affiliation to non-Indians residing,
leasing, or owning property on reservations, and subject to regulations established by
the tribal councils.
240 Senator Ervin apparently was convinced by the arguments of many tribal
attorneys and United States attorneys that tiral de novo under S. 962 would put
an intolerable strain on the district courts, already suffering from a chronic over-
load of cases. As incorporated into S. 1843, S. 962 did little more than to confirm
Golliflower. See discussion in note 201 and in text at note 201, supra.
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Crimes Act. Apparently unmoved by the explanations of the
Interior Department, Senator Ervin's S. 1847 retained the 90-day
attorney contract review deadline and his S.J. Res. 87 instructed
Interior to compile and update legal materials.
Senator Ervin did, however, retreat on S. 963 which had pro-
posed authorizing the Attorney General to investigate and prose-
cute cases in which Indian civil rights were involved, and on S. 965,
which had suggested providing concurrent federal jurisdiction over
certain crimes when the states failed to perform their law enforce-
ment duties. Since S. 963 had met with opposition both from the
Department of the Interior and tribal leadership,241 Senator Ervin
let it die quietly. S. 965, which had not provoked a particularly
substantial amount of debate,242 was apparently felt to be largely
superfluous. In states not covered by Public Law 280 federal juris-
diction already existed by virtue of the Assimilative Crimes Act.
243
Since S. 1845 provided authority for Public Law 280 states to
retrocede jurisdiction to the federal government when convinced
that the original extension of jurisdiction had been unwise, S. 965
appeared to be relevant only when a state simply refused either to
exercise jurisdiction or to retrocede it. Apparently, Senator Ervin
felt that it was more prudent to await such a situation than to
anticipate it, and he quietly buried the bill.
Because the Indian rights project raised a broad range of com-
plex constitutional issues and had produced a ponderous volume
of information, the only member of the Senate who fully under-
stood it was Sam Ervin. Furthermore, since senators are specialists
by committee assignment and must rely upon the understanding
and good will of their colleagues, Senator Ervin had virtually full
control over the destiny of the bills in the Senate. Indeed as a
senatorial courtesy and as a matter of legislative diplomacy, no
senator, even if he had entertained an objection, would have
sought to prevent Senator Ervin from enjoying the fruit of six
years' labor. Objections, if any, would have to be raised in House
debate. But Senator Ervin enjoyed the luxury of allowing the bills
to rest in subcommittee, able to order them reported to the floor
241 See part II C 3 of this artide, supra.
242 See part II C 5 of this artide, supra.
243 See note 223, supra.
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when the occasion suited him. Meanwhile, to gauge the proper
timing, Senator Ervin was closely studying the possibility of mix-
ing red with black in another civil rights storm engulfing Congress.
B. Tactics of Enactment
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to examine in
detail the machinations in Congress which produced the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, some relevant parts of that intriguing story
may be sketched. In 1967, as part of a broader civil rights package
designed primarily to protect persons exercising rights guaranteed
them by previous legislation, President Johnson submitted an
open housing measure244 similar to the one that had failed in
1966.245 The House Judiciary Committee held hearings on the
civil rights bill, H.R. 2516, but ignored the open housing measure.
Conservatives and others seeking passage of anti-riot legislation
introduced a separate measure, H.R. 421, which also was assigned
to the Judiciary Committee. Chairman Emanuel Celler bottled
up H.R. 421 until Representative Colmer, a bulwark of the Missis-
sippi Old Guard and Chairman of the House Rules Committee,
threatened to hold separate hearings on the anti-riot bill.240
Since Chairman Celler hoped to garner borderline votes for the
civil rights bill by reporting it out of committee in tandem with
the anti-riot legislation, he gave in to Congressman Colmer and
lent his qualified support to H.R. 421. Representative Celler then
added a series of provisions protecting Negroes and others from
force or violence while engaged in lawful civil rights activities,
241
and persuaded Representative Colmer to cooperate in sending the
rights bill to the floor.248 On July 11, Representative Colmer's
Rules Committee cleared the anti-riot bill,24 9 which the House
244 S. 1358, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
245 In 1966, the House had approved an Administration open housing bill, H.R.
14765, sending it to the Senate by a vote of 259 to 157. 112 CONG. REc. 18740 (1966).
Although the House measure had exempted small boarding houses and had
allowed home-owners to instruct realtors to discriminate in finding buyers for
their dwellings, it could not generate enough support in the Senate to survive an
intense filibuster. After two unsuccssful attempts at cloture, the bill died. 23
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 773 (1967).
246 23 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 782 (1967).
247 N.Y. Times, June 23, 1967, at 1, col. 2.
248 Id., June 28, 1967, at 23, col. 2.
249 Id., July 12, 1967, at 23, col. 2.
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passed eight days later by a resounding vote of 347 to 70.250 Keep-
ing faith with Representative Celler, Representative Colmer duti-
fully forwarded the civil rights bill to the floor where it was
overwhelmingly endorsed, 326 to 93.251
When the anti-riot bill reached the Senate, Senator Ervin
charged that it would compromise rights belonging to the states.
252
Senator James Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, apparently was so alarmed at the remarks of his maverick
southern colleague that he retained jurisdiction of the bill at the
full committee level, fearing that Senator Ervin's subcommittee
would hold hearings to delay its passage.253 However, Senator
Eastland allowed the civil rights bill to go to Senator Ervin's
subcommittee, but added an open housing provision that he pre-
dicted would kill it.254
Senator Ervin also was troubled by the House version of the
civil rights bill. Although generally in favor of protecting consti-
tutional rights, he had his southern constituency to consider.
Moreover, as a southerner, he shared the distaste of many in his
region at northern hegemony and northern hypocrisy on questions
of civil rights. He complained that H.R. 2516, established a new
basis of federal jurisdiction - "diversity of color" - by making
interference with the exercise of civil rights by members of mi-
nority groups a federal offense. He resented the implication that
non-whites could not receive justice outside the North. In sub-
committee he offered a substitute to H.R. 2516, grounded on the
commerce clause rather than on the fourteenth amendment, elimi-
nating "diversity of color" and making it a federal offense for any
person to interfere with the exercise of civil rights.255 The Ervin
measure also extended protection for working men exercising
rights under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act2 56 and
provided Indians those rights which had been included in S. 1843
through 1847 and in S.J. Res. 87. In short, Senator Ervin's goal
250 Id., July 20, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
251 Id., Aug. 17, 1967, at 1, col. 8,
252 Id., July 21, 1967, at 35, col. 3.
253 Id., July 27, 1967, at 1, col. 7.
254 Id., Aug. 26, 1967, at 23, col. 2.
255 See, e.g., 114 CONG. REc. 329-34 (1968).
256 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
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was either to amend the Civil rights bill into defeat or to have it
pass with his Indian rights provisions attached.
Senator Ervin's tactic was based on the axiom that in some cir-
cumstances clusters of bills may be more difficult to enact than
the same bills considered separately. If bill "A" could pass the
Senate by a 60 to 40 vote and bills "B" and "C" each by margins
of 90 to 10, and if half those opposing "B" and "C" came from the
ranks of those supporting "A", then "A" with "B" and "C" ap-
pended might fail to win a majority. It was not likely that many
senators would oppose Senator Ervin's Indian bill openly, but
influential western congressmen in the House could be expected
to resist H.R. 2516 if it returned with the Indian rights rider.
These congressmen were essential to Senator Ervin's strategy.
The Indian Affairs Subcommittee of the House Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee had given birth to Public Law 280 in
1953; and it was this body which had declared its intention "to.
get out of the Indian business. ' 257 The Subcommittee's member-
ship then included Representative Aspinall, a Democrat from
Colorado, and it had been chaired by Representative Berry, a
Republican from South Dakota. In 1967, these two legislators
remained senior authorities in their respective parties on Indian
affairs legislation. Moreover, by virtue of successive Democratic
administrations, Representative Aspinall had ascended to chair-
manship of the full committee. Both of these congressmen had
deep personal and philosophical stakes in Public Law 280.
Representative Aspinall's policy had been to remain professedly
neutral on Indian legislation but far from neutral on land and
water resources policy.258 He had been a strong proponent of pri-
vate and state ownership of resources currently under federal juris-
diction,259 and Indian reservations were among the vast acreages of
federally controlled land in western states. Public Law 280 had
provided a simple means by which to replace federal jurisdiction
with state jurisdiction in those areas. Although such a transfer did
257 Statement by Representative Saylor, supra note 68.
258 See CAHN, supra note 80, at 167.
259 Representative Aspinall had used the weight of his chairmanship to oppose
the Wilderness Act of 1963 "because he believed the act would 'tie up' portions of
federal lands from economic development." Henning, The Public Land Law
Review Commission, 7 IDAHo L. Ray. 77, 78 (1970).
[Vol. 9:557
Indian Civil Rights Act
not immediately effect a change in land ownership, it did encour-
age non-Indians to invest in reservation businesses and to develop
reservation resources under lease agreements. In Public Law 280
states, non-Indians were not subject to the regulations of tribal
councils or to the decisions of tribal courts; in any disputes, they
could protect their interests in the more friendly state legislatures
and tribunals.
As subcommittee chairman, Representative Berry had been in-
strumental in passing Public Law 280. He, too, felt it would open
the reservations to economic development. His approach had al-
ways been that of the assimilationist - to bring the Indian into
the American cultural and economic mainstream. Representative
Berry had also played an active part in the termination legislation
of 1954. He even claimed to have obtained the Indians' consent to
such legislation, although at least some Indians insisted that they
had not been consulted.260 As recently as 1961, when the termina-
tion movement was all but dead, Representative Berry continued
to call for evaluation and categorization of tribes to ascertain
which could be terminated most expeditiously.
2 61
Senator Ervin had every reason to be confident a conflict would
emerge on the House floor if H.R. 2516 were amended with his
Indian rights measures. The Ervin legislation would repeal the
section authorizing further extensions of jurisdiction by states
without tribal consent and would authorize retrocession of juris-
diction already extended. Representatives Aspinall and Berry, how-
ever, regarded Public Law 280 as so essential to the development
of reservation resources and to the assimilation of the tribes that
they wanted it implemented as soon as the states were ready. In
Senator Ervin's view, the law was not so needed that it should de-
prive Indians of due process and fail to receive their consent;
rather, he believed it should be implemented when the tribes were
ready. The split was deep. Thus, even if the civil rights bill were
to clear the Senate, resistance in the House to its changed form
might force the bill back to committee or into conference.
However, Senator Ervin was not simply exploiting the Indian
project to deter black civil rights legislation. Even if the House
260 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 19, 1955, at 76, col. 1.
261 107 CONG. REG. 2622 (1961).
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failed to approve H.R. 2516 with the Indian rights amendment,
the Indian bills would .be in no more disadvantageous a position
than if they had been passed separately by the Senate and for-
warded to the House in routine manner. The bills would go to
Representative Aspinall's committee and receive the same opposi-
tion they would receive on the floor as part of H.R. 2516. On the
other hand, the bleak future of the bills in committee made the
amendment tactic especially attractive as a positive way to secure
enactment of the Indian rights legislation. If the House were
determined to accept the Senate bill in toto, the Indian provisions
would bypass committee, becoming law despite the objections of
powerful men.
It is quite plausible that Senator Ervin had planned such a move
far in advance. Undoubtedly, he was aware of the House Interior
Committee's hostility to sections of his legislation amending Public
Law 280. Yet he had drafted those provisions at least three years
before and had remained loyal to them. They formed essential
parts of his legislative package and clearly were expressions of
personal conviction. While it is difficult to imagine why Senator
Ervin had allowed six years' work to languish, he may have been
waiting for the right opportunity to push his Indian bills.
Senator Ervin's substitute for H.R. 2516 moved through his
subcommittee with little difficulty.2 2 But it failed in the full com-
mittee by a single vote.2 63 Senator Eastland quietly allowed H.R.
2516 to reach the floor, but only when he became confident that
the bill would not be put on the calendar for 1967. Defeat in the
full committee forced Senator Ervin to call his substitute to the
floor in competition with H.R. 2516. Success along this route
seemed unlikely; thus he faced the prospect of having to introduce
provisions of the substitute as amendments. Voting on the civil
rights bill would almost certainly occur under restriction of cloture
rule XXII.264 If the Parliamentarian ruled that the Indian rights
amendments were not germane, the amendments would not be
voted - unless supporters could convince the Senate to set aside
the ruling.
One argument for the Senate's approving the Indian rights
262 N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1967, at 22, col. 1.
263 See 114 CoNG. REc. 230 (1968) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
264 SENATE MANUAL 24-25 (1971).
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amendments was that Indian rights legislation would otherwise die
in committee in the House. The past record of the Aspinall com-
mittee, which had buried every other bill that inserted a consent
clause into Public Law 280, lent weight to this contention.25
Senator Ervin acted to underscore the Aspinall committee's opposi-
tion and allay suspicions of his own motives; he consolidated S.
1843 through 1847 and S.J. Res. 87 into one bill, S. 1843 as
amended, and had the Judiciary Committee report the bill. It
passed the Senate without opposition and was directed to the
Aspinall committee. Each day the committee allowed to pass with-
out action on the bill emphasized the need to pass the Indian
rights measure as an amendment to H.R. 2516.
Just prior to the close of the First Session of the Ninetieth Con-
gress, on a sparsely populated senate floor, Majority Leader Mike
Mansfield requested and obtained unanimous consent to put H.R.
2516 on the calendar for the next session starting in 1968. Senator
Ervin subsequently called up his substitute bill, but Congress en-
countered new pressure from the President to pass the committee
bill. Senate liberals attacked Senator Ervin's measure. The
liberals tested their strength when the Senate tabled the Ervin
substitute on February 6, 1968, by a vote of 54 to 29.266
Gambling that this vote was a bellwether of senate opinion on
civil rights generally, Senators Brooke and Mondale introduced
an open housing amendment to H.R. 2516. To mollify borderline
senators, President Johnson proposed an anti-riot act, directed at
those who crossed state lines to incite riots. Events of the summer
of 1967 and the action taken in the House had made it clear that
Congress would pass such an act, with or without Administration
support. The President's statement appeared to authorize Senators
Hart, Tydings, and others managing the Administration's civil
rights package to use the assurance of tough anti-riot legislation to
"firm up" wavering commitments to open housing. However,
when Senator Mansfield delivered the first cloture petition on the
civil rights bill, some senators remained wary and provided the key
votes to defeat cloture by a vote of 55 to 87 on February 20.267
The cloture vote left the Senate's stand on open housing unclear;
265 See note 73, supra.
266 N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1968, at 23, col. 1.
267 Id., Feb. 21, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
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no one knew how that issue had affected the balloting. But when
Senator Mansfield moved to table the Brooke-Mondale amend-
ment, ostensibly because it could endanger the rest of the legisla-
tion,268 the result was a 58 to 34 straw-vote victory for civil rights
and open-housing supporters.269
Although a second cloture vote failed soon thereafter, the straw
vote appeared to move Senator Dirksen270 to support the Brooke-
Mondale amendment with "certain exceptions." A Dirksen com-
promise bill reached the floor on February 28. The Senate voted
that same day to table the Brooke-Mondale amendment.271 The
Dirksen bill, in the form of a substitute, paralleled Brooke-Mon-
dale in its exemption of "Mrs. Murphy;" the Dirksen bill further
exempted owners of single-family dwellings selling without a
broker's assistance.
After some confusion in a third unsuccessful cloture vote, the
Senate finally agreed to limit debate on the civil rights package. 27 2
Some 80 amendments to the Dirksen substitute had been filed
prior to cloture, and each now had to be read, debated, and voted
on. Among the amendments rejected were several offered by Sena-
tor Ervin.273 However, Senator Ervin's Indian rights amendment,
number 430, a duplicate of the consolidated version of S. 1843
which still languished in Representative Aspinall's committee,
fared better.
Amendment 430 caused considerable consternation at the White
House and among senate civil rights proponents. As a friend of
disadvantaged minorities, President Johnson felt compelled to sup-
port Indian rights legislation. The President included an endorse-
268 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 158 (1968).
269 N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
270 Undoubtedly a prime factor in Senator Dirksen's decision to support some
form of open housing legislation, even though he had opposed the 1966 bill on
constitutional grounds, was the erosion of Republican resistance to cloture. In
1966, two cloture votes had produced 10 and 12 Republican votes in favor, with
21 and 20 opposed. In 1968, however, the vote was split at 18 each on the first
two votes. Fully half of Senator Dirksen's party had voted against him, and even
more "yea" votes might have been cast had he not openly opposed cloture. 24 Core.
Q. ALMANAC 157 (1968). Senator Dirksen had taken great pride in being the voice of
the party on Capitol Hill and in the party conventions. A change of position was
required if he was not to lose his footing as the party shifted under him.
271 N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1968, at 20, col. 3.
272 114 CONG. REc. 4960 (1968).
273 Id. at 5813, 5822, 5825, 5834.
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ment of the amendment in his message to Congress on March 6.274
The Johnson message may have diminished resistance to the Ervin
amendment, since those torn between favoring constitutional
rights for Indians and protecting the President's civil rights pack-
age could support Senator Ervin without directly opposing the
White House.
Issues of Indian law became embroiled in parliamentary maneu-
vers. Senator Mansfield suggested a quorum was lacking,270 perhaps
in order to provide time for consultation. When the resulting or-
der for a quorum was rescinded, Senator Mansfield assured Sena-
tor Ervin that Senator Burdick had been in contact with the House
Indian Affairs Subcommittee and had learned that there was no
substantial opposition to S. 1843. But pressed by Senator Ervin,
Senator Burdick impeached his own sources and suggested that the
Subcommittee had taken no action thus far simply because it suf-
fered an overload of proposed legislation. Senator Ervin suggested
that if the Subcommittee did not have time to report legislation it
favored, the Senate should perform a service by passing the amend-
ment so that the Indian rights bill would circumvent the Subcom-
mittee.270 Senator Mansfield then "reluctantly" made the point of
order on germaneness. Senator Spong, serving as President Pro
Tem, acquiesced in the opinion of the Parliamentarian and ruled
the amendment out of order. Senator Ervin succeeded, 54 to 28, in
overturning the ruling of the chair.277 Following the vote, Senator
Hart rose to support the amendment, which subsequently was ap-
proved, 81 to 0. Almost anti-climactically, the Senate then approved
the Dirksen substitute, as amended, 61 to 19.278 Three days later,
on March 11, the Senate voted 71 to 20 to send H.R. 2516, as
amended back to the House.
279
On March 13, House Speaker McCormack emerged from a
White House conference to announce his intention to ask the
House to accept the Senate's version of H.R. 2516 in toto.280 How-
274 Id. at 5520 (1968).
275 Id. at 5834.
276 Id. at 5837-38.
277 Id. at 5838.
278 Id. at 5839.
279 Id. at 5992.
280 N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1968, at 1, col. 7.
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ever, when Representative Colmer's Rules Committee convened,
it voted to postpone action on the bill until April 9 and to conduct
hearings in the interim. That decision provided time for Repre-
sentative Aspinall to mount a last-minute campaign against the In-
dian rights provisions.281 On March 19, in the absence of his sub-
committee chairman, Representative Aspinall himself convened a
hearing on S. 1843.282 Eight witnesses testified in opposition to the
legislation, and three in favor.
While the one-day hearing raised no new issues and few new
facts, it did generate concern that H.R. 2516 should not be passed
precipitously. The hearing had provided concrete testimony both
on the need to retain Public Law 280 as a tool the states could use
to promote urban growth in the Southwest and on the opposition
of some Indians to the enumerated rights and model code sections
of the legislation. With this evidence Representative Aspinall ap-
pealed to the Rules Committee to send the Indian amendment to
H.R. 2516 to committee for further study. Representative Reifel
of South Dakota, the only American Indian serving in Congress
and one of the Indians who supported the Ervin amendment, ob-
jected and opposed further delay of the civil rights and open
housing provisions of H.R. 2516. Questioned about the Pueblos'
opposition, Representative Reifel said, in effect, that he considered
their objections to be ill-founded and accorded them little
weight. 28
3
As the Rules Committee hearings continued, Minority Leader
Ford and other senior House Republicans agreed to a conference,
pledging to accept the Senate version of H.R. 2516 if the conferees
failed to reach agreement within ten days.2 4 President Johnson
exerted his influence in characteristic fashion, urging Congress to
quit "fiddling and piddling" with his civil rights bill.28 5
Then, on the fourth day of April, Martin Luther King was killed.
281 Representative Colmer's move was also interpreted as an attempt to afford
the national real estate lobby time to bring effective pressure against the open
housing provisions. See 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 165 (1968).
282 Hearings on Rights of Members of Indian Tribes Before the Subcomm. on
Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1968).
283 114 CoNG. RiEc. 9110-12 (1968).
284 N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1968, at 28, col. 1.
285 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 165 (1968).
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The President somberly reviewed the legislation with House
leaders. Representative Ford hinted that he might be changing his
position.2 0 As April 9 approached, civil rights forces lobbied in-
tensely for passage of H.R. 2516 as a tribute to their assassinated
leader. On the critical day, the Rules Committee defeated by one
vote a motion directing H.R. 2516 to conference.28 7 A resolution
concurring in the Senate amendments was reported to the floor as
Chairman Colmer, taking note of the disorders in Washington fol-
lowing the King murder, accused his fellow committeemen of
legislating "under the gun."2
18
The debate on the floor on April 10 generally appeared to cen-
ter on whether H.R. 2516 had been so radically altered by the
Senate that its passage without further delay would impugn the
integrity of the House as a deliberative body. Discussion of the In-
dian provisions was more specific, touching on the merits and
faults of particular sections of the Ervin legislation. Several con-
gressmen participated, but Representatives Aspinall and Reifel
remained the principal figures. Representative Aspinall argued
that his hearing had revealed the spectre of treaty rights in jeop-
ardy and that by passing H.R. 2516 Congress might be destroying
the rights of one minority (Indians) to aid another (blacks). He
charged that certain procedural requirements in title I, such as
trial by jury, could destroy the tribal courts. Predictably, he at-
tacked the amendment's alterations of Public Law 280, focusing on
the possible confusion caused by states extending or withdrawing
jurisdiction over reservations.28 9 In rebuttal, Representative Reifel
routinely explained the amendment's provisions and assured the
House that the Ervin legislation would relieve the oppressiveness
of tribal governments and errors of Public Law 280.290 Represen-
tative Reifel's efforts may well have been crucial. The House voted
229 to 195 to consider the resolution to accept H.R. 2516; and by
a vote of 250 to 171, the bill was approved. The President signed
286 N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1968, at 57, col. 7.
287 The key "nay" vote was cast by Representative Anderson of Illinois who
may have been encouraged by the timely adoption of an open housing ordinance
by a city in his home district. 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 168 (1968).
288 N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1968, at 31, col. 4.
289 114 CONG. Rac. 9614-15 (1968).
290 Id. at 9552-53 (1968).
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it the following day.291 In the angry clash of black and white,
North and South, Indian law was made.
IV. THE IMPACT OF Tr 1968 AT ON INDIAN LAW
Even after the 1968 Civil Rights Act was passed, the Pueblos
sought exemption from its Indian rights provisions. In response to
their political agitation, members of the New Mexico congressional
delegation introduced bills to that effect,292 and Senator Ervin
returned to New Mexico to hold a special hearing of his subcom-
mittee. In it the Pueblos reiterated a familiar theme:
Our whole value structure is based on the concept of harmony
between the individual, his fellows, and his social institutions.
For this reason, we simply do not share your society's regard
for the competitive individualist. In your society, an aggres-
sive campaigner is congratulated for his drive and political
ability. In Pueblo society, such behavior would be looked
down upon and distrusted by his neighbors. Even the offices
themselves, now so respected, would be demeaned by sub-
jecting them to political contest. The mutual trust between
governors and governed, so much a part of our social life,
would be destroyed. 293
More specifically, the witnesses voiced concern about extending
equal protection to non-Indians in their communities and about
the bill of attainder problems created in tribal systems where the
same body often served as the tribal council and court.
Senator Ervin's response was limited. When he returned to
Washington, he introduced S. 2172 and S. 2173.2)4 The first of
these bills restricted the meaning of "any person" in title II to
"American Indians" and provided that non-Indians on the reserva-
tions were not entitled to the equal protection of tribal laws. But
291 On November 21, 1968, President Johnson issued Exec. Order No. 11435,
authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to accept states' retrocessions of jurisdic-
tion over Indian country, pursuant to the Act. That order appears with title IV
of the Act, at 25 U.S.C.A. § 1321-26. See Appendix for the language of the Ervin
legislation as it finally appeared, as Titles II-VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
292 S. 3470 and H.R. 17040, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
293 Hearings on S. 211 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (reproduced in part in
2 Am. INDIAN L. NEwsLmrER 94, 95 [1969]).
294 115 CONG. REc. 12532 (1969).
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Senator Ervin qualified his support for the bill by remarking that
he introduced it in order "to afford Congress an opportunity to
consider the advisability of such an amendment." 295 After being
placed under advisement in the Senate, S. 2172 quietly disap-
peared. The second bill, S. 2173 provided that the model code
which the Department of the Interior was instructed to draft under
title III would serve as no more than a model and would not be
imposed by Congress. Because fear of the title III had diminished
as the BIA moved slowly to draft a new code, the bill was really
addressed to a less than urgent issue. It did, however, pass the Sen-
ate on July 11, 1969;290 but after being sent to the House of Repre-
sentatives, it died in the Indian Affairs Subcommittee. The new
bills Senator Ervin introduced did not respond effectively to any
of the Pueblo problems because no proposal was made on the
equal protection controversy or on the problem of the separation
of powers. Instead, Pueblo leaders learned that their communities
were expected to conform to the 1968 legislation.
That lesson has not been lost on other major tribes, who have
begun to make the necessary adjustments, but "to date there has
been no dramatic overall change." 29 The factors prolonging the
period of transition include the need for funding (which is being
met in part by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration),
the high turnover and inadequate training of tribal judges, the
blurred separation of executive and judicial powers in a number
of tribal governments, and the continued resistance by some tribes
to congressional intrusion into their internal affairs. 298 It has been
further noted that "as long as the Bureau of Indian Affairs has not
changed the Code of Indian Offenses as directed by Congress, the
chances are slim that the tribes having their own codes will assume
any new burdens.1
299
A questionnaire to which 16 of the largest tribes responded 00
295 Id. at 12555.
296 Id. at 19259.
297 Letter from William F. Meredith, Project Director, National American Indian
Court Judges Association, to the author, April 29, 1971, on file at the office of the
Harvard Legislative Research Bureau.
298 Id.
299 Letter from Arthur Lazarus, Jr., general counsel to the Association on Amer-
ican Indian Affairs, to the author, April 5, 1971, on file at the office of the Harvard
Legislative Research Bureau.
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revealed that while only seven had permitted professional, non-In-
dian attorneys to represent criminal defendants in tribal courts
prior to 1968, 11 tribes now do, while four have expressed no
policy. The only tribe which stated that it continued to bar non-
Indian attorneys was later compelled to admit them by a federal
district court.30 1 The tribes reported a difficulty, however, in fund-
ing prosecutor's offices. Ten of the 12 tribes which lacked prose-
cutors prior to 1968 continue to operate without them. This finan-
cial inability to formalize tribal court proceedings has led one
observer to warn that a disproportionate number of habeas corpus
proceedings arising from detention by tribal authorities may re-
quire new evidentiary hearings in federal district courts, thus in
part creating the system of trial de novo which Senator Ervin
originally had intended to establish. 0 2
In other areas where reform requires money, little change has
occurred. Five of the six tribes which did not protect the defen-
dant's right to silence (apparently in order to compensate for
inadequate investigative facilities) still do not do so, or at least
have no standing policy of protection. Before 1968 two tribes made
no provision for trial by jury, and the same number today con-
tinue to refuse as a matter of policy to express the right, although
neither tribe actually denies trial by jury to all defendants. Fifteen
tribes had institutionalized appellate structures8 03 prior to 1968;
the number does not appear to have changed . 04
300 The tribes responding were the Shoshone-Bannock, Blackfeet, Cheyenne River
Sioux, Colorado River tribes, Fort Belknap, Flathead, Hopi, Jicarilla Apache,
Navaho, Northern Cheyenne, Pierre (Crow Creek and Lower Brule), Rosebud Sioux,
Standing Rock Sioux, Warm Springs Confederation, Wind River, and Yakima. The
author mailed the questionnaires in the spring of 1971 and received replies through-
out that summer. The questionnaires which support the factual propositions in the
text between notes 104 and 308 are on file at the office of the Harvard Legislative
Research Bureau. More detailed information on particular tribes has been com-
piled by the National American Indian Court Judges Association, 1345 Connecticut
Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
101 Towersap v. Fort Hall Indian Tribal Court, Civ. No. 4-70-37 (D. Idaho,
Dec. 28, 1971). See text at note 315, infra.
102 See Note, Criminal Procedure: Habeas Corpus as an Enforcement Procedure
under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 46 WASH. L. Rxv. 541, 547-50 (1971).
303 The existence of a structure does not always signify an operating appeals
system. Meredith, supra note 297.
104 This conclusion necessarily reflects the author's interpretation of the signifi-
cance of failure in some instances to respond directly to a particular question. This
evaluation is based on comments appended to the questionnaires and on earlier
testimony in the Ervin hearings.
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The federal judiciary may have the most important role in
administering change in the tribal justice systems. These courts,
especially at the district level, will determine how broadly the 1968
legislation will affect traditional practices. In construing the stat-
ute, the federal courts should look closely at the legislative history.
The legislative history of title II appears to reflect Senator
Ervin's change from an approach of imposing on the tribes the
constitutional limitations applicable to the federal government to
an approach (suggested by the Department of the Interior and
many of the tribes) of extending certain specified protections to
members of the tribes as individuals. This change was the product
of a philosophical compromise between Senator Ervin's apparent
view that the scope of public authority should be strictly defined
by the individual's need for protection and essential services, and
the view, expressed in extreme form by the Pueblos, that the scope
of individual liberty should be strictly limited by the community's
traditional need for harmony. While S. 961 had been rooted in a
theory of government with enumerated powers, title II provided
members of tribes with enumerated rights.
For the federal courts, the practical meaning of this accommoda-
tion is that title II requires a limited construction which takes an
informed account of its development. It does not authorize the
court to apply broadly such elusive and expanding concepts as
due process, equal protection, or unreasonable search and seizure
without a sensitive regard for their impact on tribal structures and
values. Because this point is fully revealed only by tracing seven
years of legislative history, there is a danger that it may be missed
and that an unlimited construction of title II will exacerbate the
tribes' difficulties adjusting to its requirements.
Three federal district court decisions illustrate this danger. In
1968, an outspoken and reportedly abrasive non-Indian attorney
directing the Navaho legal aid agency was ordered expelled from
the reservation by the tribal council. In an action to enjoin en-
forcement of the order, the attorney challenged the power of the
council to enter such an order after the enactment of title II. In
Dodge v. Nakai,305 the federal district court held that it had pen-
dent jurisdiction to hear the case despite the failure to exhaust a
805 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
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remedy available in the tribal system because not all of the issues
or parties involved were cognizable in the tribal courts. It also
based jurisdiction to hear the non-Indian's complaint against the
tribal council on the language of title II, guaranteeing equal pro-
tection of tribal laws to "any person." The court subsequently en-
joined enforcement of the order, finding that it not only denied
due process but also constituted a bill of attainder. 00
In 1969, a district court in Montana held that title II did not
directly authorize civil actions for damages against individuals who
in their official capacities violated enumerated rights. The court
did rule, however, that it had pendent jurisdiction to adjudicate
such a claim if it was coupled with an action against the tribe for
equitable or habeas corpus relief with which it shared a "common
nucleus of operative fact."8
07
A federal court in New Mexico expanded the reasoning of these
cases in a civil action for personal injuries allegedly inflicted by a
Zuni Pueblo police officer upon the plaintiff in his custody.8°8 The
Court noted that the applicable provisions of title II bore a "strik-
ing" resemblance to the fourth and fifth amendments and said:
The similarity of language and the legislative history of the
Act establish that Congress intended these provisions to limit
tribal governments as the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
limit the federal government.... The analogy of the Indian
Civil Rights Act to the Amendments is appropriate and the
law governing actions against individuals for damages under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments should be applied to the
Act. 09
Thus, in a series of decisions, district courts have built upon
notions of pendent jurisdiction and analogies to constitutionally
protected right to extend the power of the federal judiciary. The
1968 legislation has been interpreted to empower federal courts to
decide cases not previously heard by the tribal courts or brought
306 Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
307 Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969). The court
relied heavily on an analogous Supreme Court case, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715 (1966), holding that federal courts exercised pendent jurisdiction in
damage claims arising under state law coupled with federal claims sharing a "com-
mon nucleus of operative fact."
308 Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.M. 1971).
309 Id. at 374.
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to federal courts by habeas corpus, to apply developing fourth and
fifth amendment concepts, and to allow damage actions not autho-
rized by the statute. The "legislative history" to which the Loncas-
sion court referred and on which the decision was said to have
rested, has really received no consideration.
In a recent decision, the Tenth Circuit declined to follow the
examples set by these three district courts and affirmed the action
of the District Court for Wyoming. The lower court had held that
title II did not extend federal jurisdiction to hear complaints of
discriminatory practices in admission to tribal membership. 10 On
appeal, the court assumed that the application of standards for
tribal membership might raise equal protection or due process
problems, but held that the pleadings disclosed no such issues.311
Moreover, it recalled its holding in a previous case312 that title II
did not impose broad due process requirements which conflicted
with a statutory system of appointing rather than electing a tribal
chief. The Tenth Circuit stressed that "the Indian Bill of Rights
was concerned primarily with tribal administration of justice and
the imposition of tribal penalties and forfeitures and not with the
specifics of tribal structure or office-holding." 313 Had the court fully
examined the legislative history of title II, its analysis (more per-
suasive than that of the three interventionist lower courts) would
have found additional support.
This tension between restraint and intervention should not
arise, however, when the courts apply the various specific com-
mands and prohibitions of the Act. The express provision for rep-
resentation by defense attorneys, for example, has been strictly ap-
plied by district courts in Montana 14 and Idaho,315 which have
ordered tribal courts to permit non-Indian lawyers to represent
310 Pinnow v. Shoshone Tribal Council, 314 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Wyo. 1970).
311 Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971).
312 Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971).
313 Slattery, 453 F.2d at 282. Accord Lefthand v. Crow Tribal Council, 329 F.
Supp. 728 (D. Mont. 1971); but cf. Solomon v. LaRose, 335 F. Supp. 715 (D. Neb.
1971).
314 Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, Civ. No. 2780; Rafalsky v. Blackfeet Tribe,
Civ. No. 2849; Regan v. Blackfeet Tribal Court, Civ. No. 2850 (D. Mont., July 7,
1969).
315 Towersap v. Fort Hall Indian Tribal Court, Civ. No. 4-70-37 (D. Id., De-
cember 28, 1971).
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Indian defendants. In the Idaho case, the court rejected the con-
tention of the Shoshone-Bannock that the phrase "assistance of
counsel" in title II should be construed to mean only the aid of a
friend within the tribe, a practice traditionally permitted by the
tribal court. While the policy of allowing professional counsel in
tribal courts at the defendant's expense may be subject to criticism,
there is little doubt that in adhering to the plain language of the
statute the court implemented the intent of the drafter of the
provision.
The meaning of tide IV language is generally clear and may
usually be applied strictly. In Kennerly v. District Court of the
Ninth Judicial District of Montana,3 16 the United States Supreme
Court invalidated a Blackfeet tribal ordinance granting Montana
courts concurrent jurisdiction over civil actions against members
of the tribe on the ground of its failure to conform to express title
IV requirements. In so doing, the Court pointed out that Montana
had not taken legislative action to extend jurisdiction under Pub-
lic Law 280 and that the tribe had failed to evidence the consent
of its members through referendum.3 17 While this decision ap-
parently was in accord with Senator Ervin's strong feelings about
the need for consent of the governed through a vote of the mem-
bers of the tribe, the Court's opinion did not fully examine the
legislative history of title IV but relied mainly on surface statutory
construction.
Construing merely the words of the statute is proper when they
are unambiguous. The necessity for using legislative history, how-
ever, was demonstrated by the Nebraska District Court's effort to
decide whether title IV required the federal government to accept
all jurisdiction retroceded by Nebraska or whether the state could
retain part of the jurisdiction assumed under Public Law 280.11 8
The extent of the court's historical analysis was to conclude from
statutory language itself that title IV was enacted to benefit the
316 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
317 Compare Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971),
Martin v. Denver Juvenile Court, 493 P.2d 1093 (Colo. 1972); Crow Tribe of Indians
v. Deernose, 487 P.2d 1133 (Mont. 1971) with Makah Indian Tribe v. State, 76 Wash.
2d 485, 457 P.2d 590 (1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. Makah Indian Tribe V.
Washington, 397 U.S. 316 (1970) (the cause of action had arisen prior to 1968).
318 United States v. Brown, 334 F. Supp. 536 (D. Neb. 1971).
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Indians.8 19 Since the tribe in question had expressed a preference
to remain under state jurisdiction after title IV had been enacted,
the court held that the federal government could accept a partial
retrocession. The legislative history treated in this article reveals
that the hearings highlighted the need for piecemeal transfers of
jurisdiction by negotiation between state and tribe in order to
avoid problems of extradition, "no man's lands," and inadequate
law enforcement caused by "lump sum" transfers of jurisdiction.
3 20
In response, Senator Ervin had introduced S. 966 and maintained
its provisions intact until enactment as title IV. S. 966 had autho-
rized piecemeal transfers, but had provided that such transfers
could be initiated only by the states. Although the latter provision
was criticized by several tribal spokesmen, Senator Ervin retained
it, apparently to assure the states that they would be affected by
this repeal of section 7 of Public Law 280 only at their own option.
Consequently, the language authorizing piecemeal transfers of
jurisdiction was not intended solely to benefit the Indians. The
partial retrocession approved in Brown could have been grounded
more firmly in a power reserved to the states, had thd legislative
history been fully examined.
V. CONCLUSION
Each of the decisions discussed reveals a need for a closer anal-
ysis of legislative history of the Indian rights provisions. In the
future the federal courts will again be asked to construe the 1968
Act in manners inconsistent with its plain language or its history.
Advocates of further federal intervention into tribal criminal
justice systems may seek to broaden the meaning of the due
process, equal protection, or search and seizure provisions in title
II, converting the enumerated rights section into what Senator
Ervin had originally suggested but later rejected in S. 961. Oppo-
nents of the philosophical foundations of the legislation may argue
for the special construction of particular protections or prohibi-
tions in order to bring them into closer correspondence with tribal
practices before 1968. The federal judge should refrain from exer-
319 Id. at 541-42.
320 See part II C 1 of this article, supra.
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cising a broad power to establish policy when plenary power over
Indian affairs rests with Congress. The judge may believe that he
perceives what is best for the tribes within the court's jurisdiction;
but the Indians have suffered from a surfeit of patrons in all
branches of government. Given adequate resources, the tribes may
best adjust to the new legislation in a judicial milieu of sensitive,
restrained construction. In this difficult period of transition, the
judge who seizes opportunities to demand more of the tribes than
required by the letter and history of the Act might become a con-
temporary analogue to the BIA agent of an earlier period, who im-





90th Congress, H.R. 2516
April 11, 1968
AN ACr
To prescribe penalties for certain acts of violence or intimidation, and for other
purposes.
Tr= II-Rights of Indians
Definitions
Sec. 201. For purposes of this title, the term-
(1) "Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, or other group of Indians subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States and recognized as possessing powers of self-
government;
(2) "powers of self-government" means and includes all governmental powers
possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices,
tribes, and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts of
Indian offenses; and
(3) "Indian court" means any Indian tribal court or court of Indian offense.
Indian Rights
Sec. 202. No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to as-
semble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
[Vol. 9:557
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and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public
trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted
with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual pun-
ishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or
punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of $500,
or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or
deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the
right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
Habeas Corpus
Sec. 203. -The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any per-
son, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order
of an Indian tribe.
TrrLE III-Model Code Governing Courts of Indian Offenses
Sec. 301. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to recommend
to the Congress, on or before July 1, 1968, a model code to govern the administra-
tion of justice by courts of Indian offenses on Indian reservations. Such code shall
include provisions which will
(I) assure that any individual being tried for an offense by a court of Indian
offenses shall have the same rights, privileges, and immunities under the United
States Constitution as would be guaranteed any citizen of the United States being
tried in a Federal court for any similar offense,
(2) assure that any individual being tried for an offense by a court of Indian
offenses will be advised and made aware of his rights under the United States Con-
stitution, and under any tribal constitution applicable to such individual,
(3) establish proper qualifications for the office of judge of the court of Indian
offenses, and
(4) provide for the establishing of educational classes for the training of judges
of courts of Indian offenses. In carrying out the provisions of this title, the Secre-
tary of the Interior shall consult with the Indians, Indian tribes, and interested
agencies of the United States.
Sec. 302. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated such sum as may be neces-
sary to carry out the provisions of this title.
Trrra IV-Jurisdiction Over Criminal and Civil Actions
Assumption by State
Sec. 401. (a) The consent of the United States is hereby given to any State not
having jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by or against Indians in the
areas of Indian country situated within such State to assume, with the consent of
the Indian tribe occupying the particular Indian country or part thereof which
could be affected by such assumption, such measure of jurisdiction over any or all
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of such offenses committed within such Indian country or any part thereof as may
be determined by such State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over
any such offense committed elsewhere within the State, and the criminal laws of
such State shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country or part
thereof as they have elsewhere within that State.
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxa-
tion of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any
Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United
States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States;
or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent
with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant
thereto; or shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any
right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute
with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation
thereof.
Assumption by State of Civil Jurisdiction
Sec. 402. (a) The consent of the United States is hereby given to any State not
having jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians
are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country situated within such State to
assume, with the consent of the tribe occupying the particular Indian country or
part thereof which would be affected by such assumption, such measure of jurisdic.
tion over any or all such civil causes of action arising within such Indian country
or any part thereof as may be determined by such State to the same extent that such
State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such
State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall
have the same force and effect within such Indian country or part thereof as they
have elsewhere within that State.
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxa-
tion of any real or person [sic] property, including water rights, belonging to any
Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United
States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States;
or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent
with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute, or with any regulation made pursu-
ant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate
proceeding or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or
any interest therein.
(c) Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian
tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority which it may possess
shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State be given full force
and effect in the determination of civil causes of action pursuant to this section.
Retrocession of Jurisdiction by State
Sec. 403. (a) The United States is authorized to accept a retrocession by any State
of all or any measure of the criminal or civil jurisdiction or both, acquired by such
State pursuant to the provisions of section 1162 of title 18 of the United States Code,
section 1860 of title 28 of the United States Code, or section 7 of the Act of August
15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as it was in effect prior to its repeal by subsection (b) of this
section.
(b) Section 7 of the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), is hereby repealed but
such repeal shall not affect any cession of jurisdiction made pursuant to such section
prior to its repeal.
Consent to Amend State Laws
Sec. 404. Notwithstanding the provisions of any enabling Act for the admission of
a State, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any State
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to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the case
may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil or criminal
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this title. The provisions of this
title shall not become effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by
any such State until the people thereof have appropriately amended their State
constitution or statutes as the case may be.
Actions Not to Abate
Sec. 405. (a) No action or proceeding pending before any court or agency of the
United States immediately prior to any cession of jurisdiction by the United States
pursuant to this title shall abate by reason of that cession. For the purposes of any
such action or proceeding, such cession shall take effect on the day following the
date of final determination of such action or proceeding.
(b) No cession made by the United States under this title shall deprive any court
of the United States of jurisdiction to hear, determine, render judgment, or impose
sentence in any criminal action instituted against any person for any offense com-
mitted before the effective date of such cession, if the offense charged in such action
was cognizable under any law of the United States at the time of the commission
of such offense. For the purposes of any such criminal action, such cession shall take
effect on the day following the date of final determination of such action.
Special Election
Sec. 406. State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this title with respect to criminal
offenses or civil causes of action or with respect to both, shall be applicable in In-
dian country only where the enrolled Indians within the affected area of such Indian
country accept such jurisdiction by a majority vote of the adult Indians voting at a
special election held for that purpose. The Secretary of the Interior shall call such
special election under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, when re-
quested to do so by the tribal council or other governing body, or by 20 per centum
of such enrolled adults.
TrrLE V-Offenses Within Indian Country
Amendment
Sec. 501. Section 1153 of title 18 of the United States Code is amended by inserting
immediately after "weapon," the following: "assault resulting in serious bodily
injury,".
TrrE VI-Employment of Legal Counsel
Approval
Sec. 601. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if any application made by
an Indian, Indian Tribe, Indian council, or any band or group of Indians under any
law requiring the approval of the Secretary of the Interior or the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs of contracts or agreements relating to the employment of legal coun-
sel (including the choice of counsel and the fixing of fees) by any such Indians, tribe,
council, band, or group is neither granted nor denied within ninety days following
the making of such application, such approval shall be deemed to have been granted.
TITLE VII- Materials Relating to Constitutional Rights of Indians
Secretary of Interior to Prepare
Sec. 701. (a) In order that the constitutional rights of Indians might be fully pro-
tected, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to-
(1) have the document entitled "Indian Affairs, Laws, and Treaties" (Senate Docu-
ment Numbered 319, volumes 1 and 2, Fifty-eighth Congress), revised and extended
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to include all treaties, laws, Executive orders, and regulations relating to Indian
affairs in force on September 1, 1967, and to have such revised document printed
at the Government Printing Office;
(2) have revised and republished the treatise entitled "Federal Indian Law"; and
(3) have prepared, to the extent determined by the Secretary of the Interior to
be feasible, an accurate compilation of the official opinions, published and unpub-
lished, of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior relating to Indian affairs
rendered by the Solicitor prior to September 1, 1967, and to have such compilation
printed as a Government publication at the Government Printing Office.
(b) With respect to the document entitled "Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties"
as revised and extended in accordance with paragraph (1) of subsection (a), and
the compilation prepared in accordance with paragraph (3) of such subsection, the
Secretary of the Interior shall take such action as may be necessary to keep such
document and compilation current on an annual basis.
(c) There is authorized to be appropriated for carrying out the provisions of this
title, with respect to the preparation but not including printing, such sum as may
be necessary.
